Prison Phone Justice

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

Report to Congressional Committees

September 2011

BUREAU OF
PRISONS
Improved Evaluations
and Increased
Coordination Could
Improve Cell Phone
Detection

GAO-11-893

September 2011

BUREAU OF PRISONS
Improved Evaluations and Increased Coordination
Could Improve Cell Phone Detection
Highlights of GAO-11-893, a report to
congressional committees

Why GAO Did This Study

What GAO Found

The rates Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
inmates pay to make phone calls
generate revenue that funds inmate
wages and other amenities; however,
inmates’ contraband cell phone use is
growing. The Cell Phone Contraband
Act of 2010 criminalized cell phone
possession in federal prisons and
mandated that GAO study related
issues. In response to the mandate,
this report addresses (1) how
telephone rates for BOP inmates
compare with other correctional
systems and the implications of
lowering rates; (2) the number of cell
phones confiscated in BOP and
selected states, and any reported
impact; and (3) the extent to which
BOP and selected states have taken
actions to minimize cell phone
smuggling, these actions’
effectiveness, and how BOP has
coordinated internal and state
information sharing. GAO reviewed
BOP’s policies, procedures, and cell
phone confiscation data (2008–2010).
GAO also interviewed BOP officials
within BOP’s 6 regions and 4 of its 116
institutions—as well as officials from 8
state correctional departments—
selected for their cell phone detection
efforts or challenges faced. The results
are not generalizable, but provide
insights.

BOP’s rates for inmate telephone calls typically are lower than selected state and
military branch systems that also use telephone revenues to support inmate
activities; lowering rates would have several implications. Inmates would benefit
from the ability to make cheaper phone calls, but lower rates could result in less
revenue and lower profits, and therefore fewer funds available for inmate wages
and recreational activities. According to BOP officials, when inmates have fewer
opportunities for physical activity, idleness increases, and the risk of violence,
escapes, and other disruptions also rises.
BOP and selected states confiscated thousands of cell phones in 2010, and
these entities believe that rising inmate cell phone use threatens institutional
safety and expands criminal activity. All of the BOP officials, as well as officials
from all eight of the state departments of correction with whom GAO spoke, cited
cell phones as a major security concern, given the potential the phones provide
for inmates to have unmonitored conversations that could further criminal activity,
such as selling drugs or harassing other individuals.
BOP and selected states have taken actions to address contraband cell phone
use in their correctional institutions, but BOP could better evaluate existing
technologies to maximize its investment decisions. BOP screens visitors and
staff to detect contraband and has also tested multiple cell-phone detection
technologies. However, BOP has not developed evaluation plans for institutional
use to measure the effectiveness of these tests, which could help ensure that
such tests generate information needed to make effective policy decisions.
Moreover, while BOP has shared detection strategies with state agencies to
some extent, BOP’s regional offices have only had limited interaction with states,
and could increase coordination and knowledge sharing to better identify and
benefit from other strategies being used.
This is a public version of a sensitive but unclassified – law enforcement
sensitive report that GAO issued in July 2011. Information that the Department of
Justice deemed sensitive has been omitted.
Cell Phones That BOP Has Confiscated at a Federal Prison and Adjacent Camp

What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that BOP’s Director
formulate evaluation plans for cell
phone detection technology to aid
decision making, require use of these
plans, and enhance regional
collaboration with states. The
Department of Justice concurred with
GAO’s recommendations.
Source: GAO.

View GAO-11-893. For more information,
contact David Maurer at (202) 512-8777 or
maurerd@gao.gov or Mark Goldstein at (202)
512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov.
United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

Letter

1
Background
BOP Telephone Rates Typically Are Less Than Other Correctional
Systems’ Rates and Fund Inmate Wages and Recreation;
Lowering Rates Would Decrease Costs for Inmate Calls but
Could Reduce Revenue
BOP and Selected States Confiscated Thousands of Cell Phones in
2010 and Believe That Rising Inmate Cell Phone Usage
Threatens Institutional Safety and Expands Criminal Activity
BOP and Selected States Have Implemented Cell Phone Search and
Detection Technologies, but BOP Could Evaluate Technologies
Better and Increase Coordination
Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments

5

12

19

24
33
33
34

Appendix I

National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA)
Observations on Technologies to Combat Contraband Cell Phones
36

Appendix II

BOP’s Policy Memorandums and Program Statements Governing
Entrance-Screening Protocols at Prison Institutions

37

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

39

Appendix III

Tables
Table 1: Comparing the Cost of a 15-Minute Call, by Call Type,
across BOP and Selected Correctional Systems That Use
Revenues to Provide Inmate Amenities
Table 2: Inmate Amenities Funded by Profits from BOP’s Trust
Fund for Fiscal Year 2010
Table 3: Number of Cell Phones That BOP Has Confiscated in
Institutions and Camps, 2008–2010
Table 4: Number of Cell Phones That Selected State Correctional
Departments Have Confiscated

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13
17
20
22

GAO-11-893 Inmate Phone Use

Table 5: NTIA Observations on Technologies Designed to Reduce
or Eliminate Contraband Cell Phone Use
Table 6: BOP Guidance on Entrance-Screening Procedures and
Their Relation to Cell Phone Detection

36
37

Figures
Figure 1: Comparison of Local and Long Distance Minutes Used
and Telephone System Revenue, from First Quarter 2009
through First Quarter 2011
Figure 2: Sources of Trust Fund Profits in Fiscal Year 2010
Figure 3: Cell Phones That BOP Has Confiscated at a Federal
Prison and Adjacent Camp
Figure 4: BOP Screening Equipment

14
16
21
38

Abbreviations
ASCA
BOP
BOSS
DOC
DOJ
FCC
GORT
ITS
NIJ
NLECTC
NTIA
OST
RF
TRULINCS
TWG

Association of State Correctional Administrators
Bureau of Prisons
Body Orifice Security Scanner
department of correction
Department of Justice
Federal Communications Commission
Ground Observation Reconnaissance Transmitter
Inmate Telephone System
National Institute of Justice
National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology
Center
National Telecommunications and Information
Administration
Office of Security Technology
radio frequency
Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer System
technology working group

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GAO-11-893 Inmate Phone Use

United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

September 6, 2011
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
Chairman
The Honorable Charles Grassley
Ranking Member
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
The Honorable Lamar Smith
Chairman
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
Ranking Member
Committee on the Judiciary
House of Representatives
The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Bureau of Prisons (BOP) provides
telephone service to federal inmates to facilitate their contact with family
and friends and to help maintain inmates’ ties to the community.
Research has shown that such contact reduces the likelihood of inmates’
return to prison once they complete their sentences. BOP records
inmates’ calls and charges inmates rates for telephone use. In recent
years, there have been rising incidents of federal and state inmates using
contraband cell phones to circumvent correctional institutions’ telephone
systems. 1 Some prisoner advocates believe that inmates are increasingly
using contraband cell phones because of the rates correctional
institutions charge for telephone service. However, by circumventing the
correctional institutions’ telephone systems, inmates also avoid the
monitoring of their calls, and a number of reports have demonstrated that
inmates are smuggling in cell phones to coordinate criminal activity, such
as drug sales, assault, and murder. Various federal entities and state
departments of corrections (DOC) have voiced concerns over the
increasing number of contraband cell phones in correctional institutions,
stressing the potential for these devices to facilitate further criminal
misconduct. To help address this issue, the Cell Phone Contraband Act of
2010 criminalized possession of cell phones in federal prisons by defining

1

For the purposes of this report, we will use the term “cell phone” to represent not only cell
phones but also any other wireless communications devices.

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GAO-11-893 Inmate Phone Use

them as a “prohibited object” punishable by a fine or imprisonment for not
more than 1 year or both. 2
The Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010 also mandated that we study
both telephone rates and contraband cell phones in prisons. 3 Thus, this
report addresses the following questions:
1. How do BOP’s inmate telephone rates compare to those charged by
other correctional systems; how does BOP use the revenues generated
by its telephone charges; and what are the implications of lowering its
rates?
2. How many cell phones have been confiscated within BOP and selected
state institutions, and what is the reported impact, if any, of cell phone
use on overall prison security and criminal activity?
3. To what extent have BOP and selected state prisons taken actions to
prevent or minimize cell phone smuggling and use; what is known about
the actions’ effectiveness; and how has BOP coordinated information
sharing internally and with states?
This report is a public version of the prior sensitive report that we
provided to you. DOJ deemed some of the information in the prior report
as sensitive but unclassified - law enforcement sensitive, which must be
protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report omits sensitive
information about methods by which cell phones are smuggled into
prisons. In addition, at DOJ’s request, we have omitted information
regarding BOP conclusions on strategies tested and implemented by
BOP to address cell phone smuggling and use. Although the information
provided in this report is more limited in scope, it addresses the same
questions as the sensitive report. Also, the overall methodology used for
both reports is the same.

2

Cell Phone Contraband Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-225, 124 Stat. 2387. Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1791, the term “prohibited object” includes, but is not limited to, a firearm, ammunition, a
phone or other device used by a user of commercial mobile service, controlled substance,
narcotic drug, any United States or foreign currency, or any other object that threatens the
order, discipline, or security of a prison, or the life, health, or safety of an individual.
3

Pub. L. No. 111-225, § 3, 124 Stat. 2387, 2387-88.

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To determine how BOP’s prison telephone rates compare to those
charged by other correctional systems, BOP’s use of telephone revenues,
and the implications of lowering rates, we reviewed BOP’s policies and
procedures related to its inmate telephone system, the costs and
revenues of this system, the rates BOP charges inmates, inmate
amenities funded through the system, and data on phone services from
2008 through 2010. We also interviewed and gathered data from BOP
management—including officials with the BOP Trust Fund, which
manages the finances of the inmate telephone system—as well as
officials with the Department of Defense, which also provides phone
services to inmates, in order to determine how their rates compare with
those charged by BOP. In addition, from March through June 2011, we
gathered and analyzed data on inmate telephone rates from eight
selected state DOCs. 4
To learn more about the level of prison cell phone confiscations, and
inmates’ cell phone use and implications, we collected data on cell phone
confiscations for all BOP institutions and the same eight selected state
correctional systems for 2008 through 2010. We obtained information
from relevant officials about the steps taken to ensure the accuracy of all
of the above data and found the data to be sufficiently reliable for our
purposes. We also interviewed BOP officials in the Correctional Programs
Division, which is responsible for ensuring a safe institutional
environment; BOP’s Office of Security Technology (OST), which identifies
and evaluates security technology equipment within BOP, among other
things; and each of BOP’s six regions and four of its institutions. 5 We
selected these institutions based on specific technologies adopted to

4

Specifically, we interviewed and gathered data from officials in California, Florida,
Maryland, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, South Carolina, and Texas. We selected
these state correctional departments based on the level of their efforts to combat
contraband cell phones, as identified by BOP officials and records of congressional
testimony. In conducting our analysis we did not, ultimately, include rate information from
four of these states—California, Florida, New York or South Carolina—because these
states do not fund prisoner amenities from telephone revenues in a manner consistent
with BOP. This was due to either (a) these states not receiving monies from the
companies providing inmate telephone service or (b) laws requiring them to send any
monies they do receive to the state’s general fund. The views of officials from the states
whose rates we did include are not generalizable to other states, but do provide valuable
insights into issues surrounding cell phones in prisons.

5
OST officials told us they do not consider their office a testing lab or research and
development facility. Instead, OST’s task is to evaluate the effectiveness of new
technology in the federal prison environment.

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defeat cell phones, as well as other challenges posed by inmate
communications. In addition, we interviewed officials from eight state
DOCs. The views of the officials from these BOP institutions and state
departments are not generalizable to other BOP institutions or states, but
do provide valuable insights into issues surrounding cell phones in
prisons. 6 We also researched state laws to gain an understanding of the
types of state statutory provisions that have been adopted to penalize
possession or smuggling of contraband cell phones.
To determine actions being taken to prevent or minimize cell phone
smuggling, the effectiveness of these actions, and BOP’s coordination of
information sharing, we interviewed and gathered documents from
officials in BOP’s OST, regional offices, and our selected institutions to
learn about agency efforts in testing and evaluating cell phone detection
equipment and how it shares such information internally. 7 We then
compared these efforts with BOP’s program statements governing
technology evaluations, as well as GAO’s internal control standards and
GAO criteria on evaluation plans for new technology tests and
collaboration with other agencies. 8 We also interviewed state correctional
department officials and met with a nonprobability sample of officials from
DOJ’s National Institute of Justice (NIJ); NIJ’s National Law Enforcement
and Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC) system; the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC); the Department of Commerce’s
National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA); the
Association of State Correctional Administrators (ASCA); CTIA-the
Wireless Association; and two companies that make cell phone detection

6
In addition, we observed specific cell phone detection efforts at a state prison in Virginia
while conducting work on another review of correctional officer safety (see GAO, Bureau
of Prisons: Evaluating the Impact of Protective Equipment Could Help Enhance Officer
Safety, GAO-11-410 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2011)), even though Virginia was not one
of the states selected for our review.
7

In the context of this report, we define testing as BOP’s effort to determine if cell phone
detection technology will be effective in the federal prison environment.

8

GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999); Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Strengthen Its
Approach for Evaluation the SFFMI Data-Sharing Pilot Program, GAO-09-45 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 7, 2008); GAO, Aviation Security: A National Strategy and Other Actions Would
Strengthen TSA’s Efforts to Secure Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls,
GAO-09-399 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2009); and GAO, Homeland Security: Further
Actions Needed to Coordinate Federal Agencies’ Facility Protection Efforts and Promote
Key Practices, GAO-05-49 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2004).

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and defeat equipment. 9 We identified these agencies and organizations
based on their involvement in combating contraband cell phones, such as
taking part in public forums to discuss the issue. The views of those
representing these agencies are not generalizable, but they provide
valuable insights.
We conducted this work from August 2010 to September 2011 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Background

As a component of DOJ, BOP’s mission, in part, is to protect society by
confining federal offenders in the controlled environments of prisons and
community-based institutions that are safe, humane, cost-effective, and
appropriately secure. In fiscal year 2010, BOP oversaw more than
209,000 inmates, housing more than 170,000 of these inmates in its 116
institutions and relying on privately managed secure institutions;
residential reentry centers, also known as halfway houses; bed space
secured through agreements with state and local entities; and home
confinement to secure the rest. 10 In fiscal year 2011, approximately
$6.4 billion was appropriated for BOP to carry out its mission. 11

9

ASCA is an organization consisting of state and BOP officials focusing on improving
correctional practices. CTIA-the Wireless Association is a nonprofit organization that
represents the wireless-communications industry and advocates at all levels of
government on behalf of its members.

10

BOP’s 116 institutions generally have one of four security level designations: minimum,
low, medium, and high. The designations depend on the level of security and staff
supervision the institution is able to provide, such as the presence of security towers;
perimeter barriers; the type of inmate housing, including dormitory, cubicle, or cell-type
housing; and the staff-to-inmate ratio.
11
We previously reported on BOP’s Budget Process. See GAO, Bureau of Prisons:
Methods for Cost Estimation Largely Reflect Best Practices, but Quantifying Risks Would
Enhance Decision Making, GAO-10-94 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2009).

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Features of BOP’s Inmate
Telephone System

While there is no specific statutory provision requiring BOP to provide
inmates with telephone services or privileges, 12 BOP extends telephone
privileges to inmates and asserts that telephone privileges help inmates
maintain family and community ties and facilitate the reintegration of
inmates into society upon release from prison. 13 However, limitations and
conditions may be imposed upon an inmate’s telephone privileges to
ensure that these are consistent with other aspects of BOP’s correctional
management responsibilities. For example, the length of telephone calls
is generally limited to 15 minutes, and the warden may restrict or suspend
temporarily an inmate’s regular telephone privilege when there is
reasonable suspicion that the inmate has acted in a way that threatens
the safety, security, or good order of the institution, or the protection of
the public. For many years, BOP provided inmates with collect-call
service only—whereby the receiving party, and not the inmate, bore the
cost of the call. In 1988, BOP began to shift to its current Inmate
Telephone System (ITS), which provides both a collect call and a directdial option, emphasizing inmates’ financial responsibility and reducing the
burden on others of inmates’ calls. 14
BOP personnel within the individual prisons maintain the ITS. Specifically,
BOP staff are responsible for installing, maintaining, and repairing the
telephone system. Vendors provide the hardware and software that
enable ITS, also known as TRUFONE, to perform the following:




use voice recognition to identify inmates placing calls;
provide each inmate with a “personal access code,” which allows
inmates’ TRUFONE accounts to be debited for the cost of their calls; 15
check the inmate’s TRUFONE account to make sure the inmate has
sufficient funds for a one-minute phone call;

12

Certain federal courts have held that inmates have a First Amendment right to some
level of telephone access, but this right is subject to reasonable restrictions related to
prison administration and security. Johnson v. Galli, 596 F. Supp. 135, 138 (D. Nev.
1984); Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1100 (6th Cir. 1994).

13

U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement, No.
P5264.08, Inmate Telephone Regulations, provides national policy and procedure
regarding inmate telephone privileges within BOP institutions and contract facilities.

14

Generally, BOP allows each inmate to designate up to 30 phone numbers on his or her
“contact” list.
15

BOP provides every inmate with a bank-type account into which money can be
deposited and withdrawn for purchases such as snacks, telephone calls, or laundry.

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





record all calls automatically;
restrict inmates’ calls to numbers on the inmates’ contact lists;
require placement of calls only from specific telephones;
deny particular inmates access to telephones as warranted; and
terminate all prison telephone service if security needs dictate.

In addition to direct-dial telephone service, BOP has recently made e-mail
available to inmates in all of its institutions through an electronicmessaging system. Through this electronic-messaging system, inmates
can communicate with a list of contacts, but they cannot access the
Internet. Both inmates and persons in the community with whom they
correspond must consent to having all incoming and outgoing electronic
messages monitored and retained by staff. 16

BOP’s Trust Fund and the
Inmate Amenities It
Supports

BOP established commissaries to allow inmates to purchase items not
issued by prisons. Inmates purchase commissary items with funds
available in individual inmate accounts managed by BOP. Funds are
placed into these accounts by friends and family members (through
BOP), or may be earned as wages through work performed in Federal
Prison Industries or other on-site work at an institution (e.g., food service,
laundry). 17 In 1998, the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999 provided BOP with the authority
to accept revenues and make expenditures from the Commissary Fund of
the Federal Prison System in order to pay for ITS as well as other
prisoner amenities. 18 This authorized trust fund is a self-sustaining
revolving fund account in which BOP deposits revenues generated by
inmate telephone charges through ITS and pays the expenses of ITS
operations—rather than through appropriations. BOP uses the profits (the
amount of revenue that exceeds expenses) from operating the inmate
telephone service, as well as those from the commissary and other
services, to provide inmate amenities, such as employment opportunities

16

The pilot of the electronic messaging program began April 14, 2005, and was completely
implemented on January 30, 2011. BOP issued Program Statement P5265.13, Trust Fund
Limited Inmate Computer System (TRULINCS).
17
Federal Prison Industries is a federal government corporation established by Congress
in 1934 to, among other things, employ and provide job skills training to a number of
federal inmates, and produce goods and services for sale to the federal government.
18

Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 108, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-67 (Oct. 21, 1998) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 4043 note).

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and educational and recreational activities, that are not currently
supported through appropriations. By providing amenities like these
through telephone system profits, BOP is similar to other federal
correctional institutions like those within the Department of Defense. In
particular, the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps all charge inmates
rates above cost for telephone service. The Navy uses the profits to
provide items or activities, such as movies and sports contests, for the
benefit of the inmates exclusively, while the Army and the Marine Corps
use the funds to provide amenities to all persons on the base.

The Cell Phone
Contraband Act of 2010
and BOP’s Process for
Addressing Cell Phone
Possession

In August 2010, the Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010 was passed and
amended 18 U.S.C. § 1791 to prohibit an inmate of a prison from
possessing, obtaining, or attempting to obtain a cell phone. 19 The Cell
Phone Contraband Act also provided for punishing such possession with
a fine or imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or both. BOP stated that
cell phones are considered hazardous tools, as defined by BOP policy as
tools most likely to be used in an escape attempt or to serve as weapons
capable of doing serious bodily harm to others; or those hazardous to
institutional security or personal safety. According to officials in BOP’s
Correctional Programs Division, when an inmate is caught with a cell
phone, an incident report is filed and the inmate is subject to BOP’s
disciplinary process, which involves an administrative hearing. 20 The
inmate ultimately could face a range of sanctions from transfer to a
higher-security institution to loss of “good time” or other privileges. 21 BOP
may refer the case to a law enforcement agency with criminal
investigative authority for investigation, and/or to the local U.S. Attorney’s
Office, which maintains discretion for prosecution.

19

Cell phones are low-powered radio transceivers (a combination radio transmitter and
receiver) that use radio waves (spectrum) to communicate with base stations.
Electromagnetic spectrum is the medium that enables wireless communications of all
kinds, including cell phone and paging services, radio and television broadcasting, radar,
and satellite-based services.
20
The Correctional Programs Division oversees BOP’s efforts to ensure safe, secure
institutions for inmates and staff.
21
Good conduct time is a credit (measured in days) that an inmate may earn based on
adherence to prison rules and lack of punishment received that is deducted from the
inmate’s sentence.

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Other Federal Agencies’
Roles in Exploring and
Addressing Contraband
Cell Phone Issue

In addition to BOP, various federal agencies serve as key stakeholders in
exploring and addressing the illicit use of cell phones in federal and state
prisons. For example, DOJ’s National Institute of Justice (NIJ)
coordinates subject matter experts into three technical working groups to
address, among other topics, illicit cell phone use. 22 Further, at its 2010
National Conference, NIJ convened a plenary panel to discuss the
detection and defeat of cell phone use in prisons. NIJ also funds the
National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center
(NLECTC) system, which assists state, local, tribal, and federal
correctional agencies, as well as law enforcement and criminal justice
agencies, in addressing technology needs and challenges, such as
contraband cell phones.
NIJ also hopes to soon establish an interagency working group with
representatives from BOP, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC), and the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA), to continue working on solutions to overcome illicit
cell phone use in prisons, subject to the availability of funds. 23 In
particular, the FCC maintains an important role in combating illicit cell
phone use in prisons because the FCC, in general, executes and
enforces the provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, which
prohibits nonfederal entities—such as state correctional institutions—from
intentionally interfering with or blocking radio communications signals,
which include cell phone transmissions. In addition, NTIA is a critical
partner for the research capacity it possesses. Specifically, in December
2009, Congress directed NTIA, in coordination with BOP, FCC, and NIJ,
to develop a plan to investigate and evaluate how wireless jamming,
detection, and other technologies might be used for corrections
applications in federal and state prison institutions. 24 In response to this
congressional direction, in May 2010, NTIA issued a Notice of Inquiry

22

NIJ funds research, development, and evaluation related to crime and criminal justice
issues and programs, including research, development, and evaluation related to criminal
justice tools and technologies.
23
FCC is an independent federal agency that regulates interstate and international
communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable—as such, FCC has
oversight over the use of spectrum for states, localities, and the private sector. NTIA, an
agency within the U.S. Department of Commerce, has principal responsibility for advising
the President on telecommunications and information policies and has oversight of the
use of spectrum by federal agencies, such as BOP.
24

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 111-366, at 619 (2009).

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seeking public comment on “technologies that would significantly reduce
or eliminate contraband cell phone use without negatively affecting
commercial wireless and public safety services … in areas surrounding
prisons.” 25 These technologies include the following:






Jammers: Devices that transmit on the same radio frequencies as
cell phones, disrupting the communication link between the phone
and the cell phone tower, essentially rendering the cell phone
unusable until the jamming stops.
Managed access systems: Those that intercept, or re-route, certain
cell phone calls (i.e., unauthorized calls that inmates attempt) away
from carrier networks, preventing them from reaching towers and
completing the call.
Detection systems/devices: Those that locate, track, or identify
unauthorized cell phones by, for example, scanning frequencies within
correctional institutions to detect the location of a caller.

After analyzing the comments it received, NTIA issued observations on
advantages and disadvantages of each of these strategies, as detailed in
appendix I. 26 NTIA also reported that prison officials should be able to use
technology for combating prison cell phone use while not disrupting public
safety and federal government entities’ use of spectrum or citizens’ use of
airwaves for cell phone communications.

States and Nonfederal
Entities’ Roles

A number of states have expressed concerns over threats posed by
contraband cell phones in their correctional institutions and sought out
both independent solutions and federal assistance. In particular, during
2009, officials from 31 state and 2 regional (i.e., city-based) prison
systems requested that the FCC initiate rulemaking to permit jamming of
commercial mobile radio services (which would include cell phone
signals) within correctional institutions. 27 Also, officials from Texas and
Maryland correctional departments have testified before Congress about

25

Preventing Contraband Cell Phone Use in Prisons, 75 Fed. Reg. 26733-01 (May 12,
2010).
26

U.S. Department of Commerce, Contraband Cell Phones in Prisons: Possible Wireless
Technology Solutions (December 2010).

27

See Petition for Rulemaking of South Carolina Department of Corrections before the
Federal Communications Commission, WT Docket No. 09-30 (Aug. 6, 2009).

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the dangers posed by cell phones in prisons and to support passage of a
bill known as the Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009. 28
States have implemented different means to define the legality of cell
phone possession in prisons. Some states have specific statutory
provisions making it illegal for inmates to possess cell phones while
incarcerated in a state prison institution, 29 while other states have
statutorily defined cell phones to be contraband that is prohibited within a
state prison institution. 30 In addition, there are other states that have
general statutory provisions banning contraband and allow the
department of corrections to define what items are contraband
administratively. 31

28

The Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009, S. 251, 111th Cong. (2009), passed the
U.S. Senate in October of that year but was not enacted. The bill would have amended
the Communications Act of 1934 to allow the FCC to authorize non-federal entities, such
as state correctional facilities, to operate systems that would prevent, jam, or otherwise
interfere with wireless communications from inmates held in those facilities. This act was
referred to the House of Representatives that same month, and no further action was
taken.

29
For example, Maryland has a specific statutory provision with regard to cell phones in
prison. A person detained or confined in a place of confinement may not knowingly
possess or receive a telecommunications device. A person who violates this provision is
guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 3
years or a fine not exceeding $1,000 or both. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 9-417.
30

For example, Arizona has a statutory provision that specifically includes a "wireless
communication device" within the meaning of "contraband" in the correctional facility
context. Generally, a person, not otherwise authorized by law, commits the felony of
promoting prison contraband by knowingly taking contraband into a correctional facility or
the grounds of a correctional facility; or conveying contraband to any person confined in a
correctional facility; or making, obtaining or possessing contraband while being confined in
a correctional facility or while being lawfully transported or moved incident to correctional
facility confinement. Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-2501, 13-2505.

31

For example, Alabama has a general contraband statute. The statute defines
contraband as any article or thing which a person confined in a detention facility is legally
prohibited from obtaining or possessing by statute, rule, regulation, or order. A person
confined in a detention facility that intentionally and unlawfully makes, obtains or
possesses any deadly weapon, instrument, tool or other thing which may be useful for
escape is guilty of promoting prison contraband in the first degree which is a Class C
felony. Further, a person confined in a detention facility that intentionally and unlawfully
makes, obtains, or possesses any contraband is guilty of promoting contraband in the
third degree which is a Class B misdemeanor. Cell phones could be covered by statute,
rule, regulation, or order. Ala. Code §§ 13A-10-30, 13A-10-36, 13A-10-38.

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In addition, the Association of State Correctional Administrators (ASCA)—
an organization comprised of both BOP and state correctional officials
that seeks to improve correctional services and practices—has been
active in studying the issue of cell phones in prisons. For example, in July
2010, ASCA hosted a symposium to discuss the problem of cell phone
smuggling and potential solutions to address the issue.

BOP Telephone Rates
Typically Are Less
Than Other
Correctional Systems’
Rates and Fund
Inmate Wages and
Recreation; Lowering
Rates Would Decrease
Costs for Inmate Calls
but Could Reduce
Revenue

BOP’s rates for inmate telephone calls typically are lower than selected
states’ and military branch systems that also use inmate telephone
revenue to support inmate amenities, and lowering rates would have
several implications. BOP charges inmates $0.06 per minute for local
calls and $0.23 per minute for long distance calls, with no connection
charge. BOP sets its rates to cover the cost of operating the telephone
system and to generate profits, which BOP uses to provide the majority of
funding for inmate amenities—the most significant of which are wages for
inmate employment and expenses associated with inmate recreational
activities. If BOP reduced inmate telephone rates, inmates would benefit
from the ability to make less expensive phone calls. However, lower rates
also could result in less revenue, lower profits, and therefore fewer funds
available for inmate wages and other amenities, unless BOP recovers
these funds through other sources. According to BOP officials, when
inmates have fewer opportunities for physical activity, idleness increases
and the risk of violence, escapes, and other disruptions also rises.

BOP’s Inmate Telephone
Rates Typically Are Less
Than Those Charged by
Other Correctional
Systems That Also Fund
Inmate Amenities

Currently, for direct dial calls, BOP charges inmates per minute rates of
$0.06 for local calls and $0.23 for long distance calls with no connection
charge. For collect calls, both local and long distance, BOP charges a
connection fee and per minute charge. 32 The rates that BOP charges
inmates for a 15-minute direct-dial local call typically are lower than rates
charged by most other correctional systems, such as state systems and
Department of Defense military prisons that also use telephone system
revenue to help finance prisoner amenities. 33 As illustrated by table 1, a
direct dial long distance call lasting 15 minutes would cost a BOP inmate

32

Direct dial calls allow the inmate to dial the call and pay for it using their TRUFONE
account; collect calls are calls that require the recipient to pay.
33

According to BOP officials, inmate telephone rates are set in order to generate sufficient
revenue to pay the costs of the inmate telephone system and support specific inmate
amenities.

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significantly less than if he or she made that call in most other selected
comparable correctional systems.
Table 1: Comparing the Cost of a 15-Minute Call, by Call Type, across BOP and Selected Correctional Systems That Use
Revenues to Provide Inmate Amenities
Local – direct
dial/debit card

Correctional system

Long
distance – direct
dial/debit card

Long
distance/collect

a

$3.45

$8.45

Local - collect

Bureau of Prisons

$0.90

Department of Defense - Army

$3.75

$6.00

$3.75

$6.00

Department of Defense - Navy

$6.00

$16.08

$6.00

$16.08

Department of Defense Marines

$6.00

$16.08

$6.00

$16.08

Maryland Division of Correction

$0.50

$0.85

$4.50

$7.20

State does not offer
direct dial

$2.85

State does not offer
direct dial

$14.55

New Jersey Department of
Corrections

$4.95

$4.95

$4.95

$4.95

Texas Department of Criminal
Justiceb

$3.90

$3.90

$6.45

$6.45

Mississippi Department of
Corrections

$0.95 - $5.70

Source: GAO analysis of BOP, Department of Defense, and state data.
a

State utility commissions have jurisdiction over local collect call rates so they vary depending on the
state in which the prison is located.
b

Although Texas does not use telephone revenues to provide prisoner amenities, it does require the
telephone service provider to pay the state 40 percent of gross revenues; the first $10 million goes to
the Victims Services Crime Fund.

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Revenues, Costs, and
Profits of BOP’s Telephone
System

In fiscal year 2010, BOP’s inmate telephone system generated
approximately $74 million in revenue, cost approximately $39 million to
operate, and showed a profit of approximately $34 million. Records
provided by BOP for the first quarters of 2009, 2010 and 2011 indicated
that inmates’ long distance calls generated more than 90 percent of
BOP’s telephone revenues. 34 According to BOP officials, over the past
12–18 months, the inmate telephone service has generated significantly
less revenue as inmates purchased more local minutes and fewer long
distance minutes. Figure 1—which shows the local and long distance
phone minutes used and phone-system revenues for the first quarters of
2009, 2010, and 2011—illustrates this trend.
Figure 1: Comparison of Local and Long Distance Minutes Used and Telephone
System Revenue, from First Quarter 2009 through First Quarter 2011
Revenue (in millions of dollars)

Minutes (in millions)
90

21.0

85
20.5

80
75

20.0
70
19.5
20
19.0

15
10

18.5
5
0
FY 2009, Q1

FY 2010, Q1

0
FY 2011, Q1

Quarter
Quarterly revenue
Long distance minutes
Local minutes
Source: BOP.

34
BOP officials told us this is an estimate. According to BOP officials, they generate a
consolidated audited financial statement for the entire Inmate Trust Fund Program rather
than a separate audited profit and loss statement for the Inmate Telephone System.

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BOP officials attribute this shift from long distance to local minute calls to
the emergence of technology that allows inmates’ friends and family who
do not live within the inmates’ local calling area to acquire telephone
numbers local to the inmates’ prison locations. As a result, long distance
calls that previously cost inmates $0.23 per minute can now be made for
the local rate of $0.06 per minute—a savings of more than 70 percent on
a 15-minute call. BOP officials told us that this trend has prompted them
to consider eliminating the distinction between local and long distance call
rates and instead set a uniform price for calls of either type that would fall
somewhere between the current local and long distance rates. According
to officials, this would lower rates for approximately 84 percent of the calls
made by inmates that are long distance. BOP officials told us that while
they anticipate losing some of the revenue generated by long distance
minutes, they believe the sale of access minutes for their electronic
messaging system, which has recently become available in all federal
prisons, will compensate for some lost revenue. 35 BOP officials told us
that the number of electronic message minutes sold in 2010, at $0.05 per
minute, was more than twice the number sold in 2009, and they expect
even more minutes to be sold in 2011.
With respect to telephone system costs, in fiscal year 2010, BOP spent
approximately $39 million to operate the telephone system. About
$9.7 million of this amount covered the costs of the telephone system’s
physical resources, including hardware and software, which were
purchased through competitively bid, governmentwide contracts. Just
over $22 million covered labor costs, including technical, operational, and
administrative costs of the inmate telephone system at each of the
institutions. Another $7.5 million covered personnel salaries and benefits
of headquarters staff, who provide administration and program
management, including policy and procedures development, and training.
BOP’s telephone system generated more than $34 million in profits in
fiscal year 2010. 36 Since BOP both receives and disburses money to pay

35

BOP began a pilot electronic messaging program in April 2005 and concluded Bureauwide implementation in January 2011. Inmates are only permitted to exchange electronic
messages with persons who have accepted the inmate’s request to communicate. BOP
issued Program Statement P5265.13 on February 19, 2009, describing the operation of
the Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer System (TRULINCS)—Electronic Messaging.
36
BOP officials told us this is only an estimate. According to BOP officials, they generate a
consolidated audited financial statement for the entire Inmate Trust Fund Program rather
than a separate audited Profit and Loss statement for the Inmate Telephone System.

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for telephone service operations through its Trust Fund, profits from
telephone service are also retained therein. In fiscal year 2010, BOP’s
Trust Fund had total revenues, which included collections from BOP’s
commissary services, of $331 million. After paying all related costs for
phones and commissary provisions, there were Trust Fund revenues in
excess of expenses of over $46 million and BOP’s phone service was
responsible for $34 million, or 74 percent of this amount, while Trust Fund
profits from all other sources amounted to almost $12 million, as shown in
figure 2.
Figure 2: Sources of Trust Fund Profits in Fiscal Year 2010

26%

$11,995,839

74%
$34,235,528

Profits from inmate telephone systems
Trust fund profits from all other sources
Source: GAO analysis of BOP data.

BOP officials told us that BOP uses revenue from its Trust Fund to pay for
various inmate amenities, such as wages to inmates and recreational
materials—as illustrated by table 2. However, by law, there are some
specific inmate amenities, among other items, that cannot be purchased

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with Trust Fund revenues. 37 BOP officials told us that all aspects of
BOP’s work are audited annually by an independent auditing and
accounting firm, including BOP’s financial records; officials told us that
BOP has been certified as in compliance since 1999. 38
Table 2: Inmate Amenities Funded by Profits from BOP’s Trust Fund for Fiscal Year 2010
Amenity type

Description

Inmate wages

Funds income inmates earn from work within the institution, working in areas such as
food service, commissaries, facilities (electrical, plumbing, welding, painting, landscaping)
laundry, and as barbers, tutors, law library clerks, and warehouse workers.

Amount

$34,978,786

Recreational activities

Board games, movies, educational books, and cable television. There is no funding of
administrative costs such as salaries for staff.

$8,555,291

Distribution of profits to
institutions

Items purchased with these funds include holiday packages for the inmates, microwave
ovens, washers and dryers, seasonal programs, holiday decorations, children’s items,
and programs for children of inmates.

$1,249,896

Completion awards

Small monetary awards for inmates’ completion of psychological treatment programs.

$1,099,332

Psychology program

Drug abuse programs, group and individual psychotherapy, social skill building, mental
health counseling, etc., for inmates.

$223,381

“Artist in Residence”
program

An interagency agreement with the National Endowment for the Arts provides and funds
this program for the inmate population; currently, there is a creative writing program
provided at five locations.

$80,000

Provides for inmates to participate in a national reading program.

$44,681

“Reading Is Fundamental”

Source: BOP.

37

None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available to BOP, including Trust
Fund revenues, may be used to provide the following amenities or personal comforts in
the federal prison system: (a) televisions in cells except for prisoners who are segregated
from the general prison population for their own safety; (b) the viewing of R, X, and NC-17
rated movies, through whatever medium presented; (c) any instruction (live or through
broadcasts) or training equipment for boxing, wrestling, judo, karate, or other martial art,
or any bodybuilding or weightlifting equipment of any sort; (d) possession of in-cell coffee
pots, hot plates, or heating elements; or (e) the use or possession of any electric or
electronic musical instrument. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-77, § 611, 115
Stat. 748, 800 (Nov. 28, 2001) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4042 note).
38
In 2001-2002, there was some criticism by the auditing agency regarding insufficient
security for information system controls. That issue has since been remedied. In addition,
GAO reviewed the audited financial statements of BOP for fiscal years 2006, 2007, 2008,
2009, and 2010 and agreed with the auditors that the audits for these fiscal years were
presented fairly and were in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.

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Lowering Phone Rates
Would Reduce the Cost of
Inmate Calls but Could
Leave Fewer Funds
Available for Inmate
Activities

Lowering the rates it charges inmates for phone calls would have several
implications for BOP and inmates. The primary advantage would be that
inmates would incur lower costs for making calls. This could possibly
encourage greater communication between inmates and their families,
which BOP has stated facilitates the reintegration of inmates into society
upon release from prison. 39 In contrast, reducing inmate telephone rates
could also have some disadvantages. BOP officials told us that lowered
rates would likely result in lower revenues for the Trust Fund and
therefore less profit, unless some provision was made to replace the lost
revenue. With fewer profits, BOP would have less Trust Fund money to
spend on inmate amenities. As a result, unless BOP recouped these
revenues from other sources, BOP would have to reduce the wages it
pays inmates for their labor and/or scale back the number and type of
other educational and recreational activities it currently offers using
revenue from the Trust Fund. According to BOP officials, such reductions
could make prisons more dangerous to manage and more expensive to
operate. For example, BOP officials said that inmates perform electrical
work, which keeps prisons well lighted, as well as janitorial services,
which preserve order and cleanliness—both of which contribute to
institutional safety and reduce inmate idleness. According to BOP
officials, inmate idleness increases the risk of violence, escapes, and
other disruptions. BOP officials also reported that inmate work
programs—which teach inmates, many of whom have never held a
traditional job before, work skills and a work ethic (e.g., coming to work on
time, taking directions from a supervisor, working effectively with coworkers)—can help inmates assimilate back into society upon completion
of their prison sentence. This helps to reduce recidivism and thus
contributes to public safety.
If BOP wanted to lower inmate telephone rates while maintaining the
current level of inmate services, BOP could explore one of two
approaches: (1) recoup lost revenue resulting from lowered telephone
rates by increasing prices inmates pay for other services, such as
commissary items or electronic messaging system access, or (2) seek
authorization allowing BOP’s general appropriation to be available for
inmate amenities in addition to the funds from the Trust Fund. Regarding
the first approach, BOP officials told us that they already receive inmate

39

Approximately 25 percent of inmates use all of their allotment of 300 minutes per month,
so these inmates would not be able to make additional calls, even if rates were lower.

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complaints related to current commissary prices, and as a result, the
officials indicated reluctance to choose this option. In addition, raising
commissary prices could result in inmates purchasing fewer items, and
coupled with decreased telephone rates, overall Trust Fund revenues
could decline, resulting in less funding available for inmate amenities,
including wages. With respect to the second approach, if BOP reduced
rates for telephone service and was given authority to replace the lost
revenue with its appropriations, BOP could maintain both the inmate
wage rate and the type and variation of inmate activity, and keep the
prices inmates pay for other services from increasing. However, to
accomplish this, BOP would have to seek authorization allowing BOP’s
general appropriation to be available for inmate amenities, in addition to
the funds from the Trust Fund. 40 BOP officials told us they did not think
this option was a realistic possibility, as they do not believe Congress
would appropriate money for prisoner amenities.

BOP and Selected
States Confiscated
Thousands of Cell
Phones in 2010 and
Believe That Rising
Inmate Cell Phone
Usage Threatens
Institutional Safety
and Expands Criminal
Activity

BOP and officials from most of the selected states we contacted reported
increases in the numbers of cell phones confiscated at prisons over the
last 3 to 4 years and cite cell phone use as a security concern. All of the
BOP officials, as well as officials from all eight of the states’ DOCs with
whom we spoke, cited cell phones as a major security concern, given the
potential the phones provide for inmates to have unmonitored
conversations that could further criminal activity, such as selling drugs or
harassing other individuals.

40

Because the Director of BOP may make expenditures out of the Commissary Fund of
the Federal System for programs, goods, and services for the benefit of inmates (to the
extent the provision of those programs, goods, or services to inmates is not otherwise
prohibited by law), general appropriations may not be used for those purposes. The
specific authority to operate the fund for the purposes described acts as a specific
appropriation for that purpose. If an agency has a specific appropriation for a particular
purpose, and also has a general appropriation broad enough to cover the same purpose,
it does not have an option as to which to use. It must use the specific appropriation.

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BOP’s and Selected States’
Cell Phone Confiscations
Have Increased in the Last
2 Years

BOP has tracked the number of cell phones confiscated at its institutions,
by prison camp and secure institutions, since 2008. Table 3 shows that
the number of cell phones confiscated has increased each of the last 2
years. As the data also illustrate, over three-fourths (77 percent) of all cell
phones confiscated at BOP institutions are found at prison camps, or
“minimum security” institutions—this despite the fact that prison camps
have accounted for only about 13 percent of BOP’s inmate population
from fiscal years 2008-2010. Prison camps typically are located adjacent
to larger, higher-security institutions but are usually not surrounded by
perimeter fencing. In some instances, camps are located very near local
roads or wooded areas.

Table 3: Number of Cell Phones That BOP Has Confiscated in Institutions and Camps, 2008–2010
Type of BOP institution
High, medium, low security institutions
Minimum security institutions (prison camps)
Total

2008

2009

2010

Total

255 (14%)

591 (18%)

1,161 (32%)

2,007 (23%)

1,519 (86%)

2,607 (82%)

2,523 (68%)

6,649 (77%)

1,774 (100%)

3,198 (100%)

3,684 (100%)

8,656 (100%)

Source: GAO analysis of BOP data.

To illustrate the extent of the problem at one federal correctional complex,
figure 3 shows cell phones confiscated by BOP from a federal prison and
its adjacent work camp over a 1-year period.

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Figure 3: Cell Phones That BOP Has Confiscated at a Federal Prison and Adjacent
Camp

Source: GAO.

Officials from BOP’s Correctional Programs Division and three of the six
regions that we spoke with attribute the rise in confiscated cell phones to
the ease of availability of small, low cost cell phones that allow inmates to
carry on unmonitored conversations with the desired contacts. In addition,
officials we interviewed from two of the six regions also cited increasingly
stringent search procedures by staff at some prisons resulting in a greater
number of cell phone confiscations. Correctional Programs Division
officials added that a combination of easier access to cheaper cell
phones, better awareness by staff conducting contraband searches, and
better collection of intelligence have all contributed to these increases, but
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it is difficult to determine how much each factor has resulted in increased
cell phone confiscations.
We selected and obtained information from eight states during the course
of our review, and these selected states in general are also dealing with
increasing numbers of contraband cell phones, as shown in table 4.
Some of these selected states maintain cell phone confiscations in the
aggregate and have not broken it out by camps as compared to secure
institutions.
Table 4: Number of Cell Phones That Selected State Correctional Departments Have
Confiscated
State

2007

2008

2009

2010

Californiaa

900

2,800

6,900

10,700

Floridab

n/a

242

1,026

1,509

c

Maryland

741

1,236

1,658

1,128

Mississippi

n/a

2,200

3,600

4,300

New Jerseyd

n/a

n/a

n/a

249

New York

55

75

93

85

n/a

2,015

2,594

3,241

n/a

1,226

1,480

1,193

South Carolina
Texas

e

f

Source: Correctional departments from the states listed.
a

In 2009, California began to include cell phone confiscation data from its community correctional
facilities (private or publicly run contracted facilities for low level offenders) and California out-of-state
correctional facilities (private facilities in several states that California has contracted with to house
inmates). California officials stated that these types of facilities house approximately five to six
percent of all state inmates.
b

Florida did not begin keeping counts of contraband cell phones until October 2008.

c

Maryland data was provided by fiscal year, not calendar year.

d

New Jersey began capturing data on contraband cell phones in mid-2010; the data shown covers the
time period July 2010 through February 2011.
e

South Carolina includes cell phone parts and accessories, such as batteries and chargers, in its
count of cell phone confiscations. One official estimated that the cell phones themselves account for
about 70 percent of these totals.
f

Texas’ 2008 data represents the number of “incidents” of cell phone confiscations; there could have
been multiple cell phones found in one incident. In 2009 and 2010, Texas also separated the data
gathered by cell phones confiscated before and after introduction to the inmate population. For 2009,
370 of the 1,480 cell phones were confiscated before entering the inmate population (e.g., inside of
mailrooms, outside prison perimeter). For 2010, 402 of the 1,193 cell phones were confiscated before
entering the inmate population.

The types of institutions in which most cell phones are found varied
among the states we contacted. For example, officials we interviewed
from two of the eight states indicated that based on their experience,
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most phones were found in prison camps, while officials from five other
states said that their states have confiscated greater numbers of cell
phones in more secure institutions. Officials from the eighth state said the
number of cell phones found in camps and secure institutions was about
equal. Three states also attribute the increase in cell phone confiscations
to the availability of smaller, cheaper cell phones and additional search
and detection efforts they have employed to identify cell phones.

BOP and Officials from
Selected States Reported
That Contraband Cell
Phones Can Threaten the
Safety within Institutions
and Expand Criminal
Activity

Officials we contacted from BOP’s Correctional Programs Division, six
regional offices, and four institutions—as well as from each of the eight
states we selected for our review—all cited contraband cell phones as an
issue of serious concern. According to BOP officials in particular, inmates
with cell phones are able to circumvent the approved prison telephone
system and thus are able to hold unmonitored conversations. This, the
BOP officials reported, could lead to several actions that threaten the
security of prisons and expand criminal activity both inside and outside of
a prison institution. For example, inmates could use cell phones to
arrange the delivery of contraband drugs or other goods, transmit
information on prison staff to or from noninmates, harass witnesses or
other individuals, or potentially coordinate an escape.
BOP management does not currently compile any specific data or
prepare comprehensive reports of situations where contraband cell
phones were used to conduct criminal activity in federal prisons—nor do
DOJ or the Cell Phone Contraband Act require that these things be done.
However, BOP officials we interviewed from two of the regions provided
examples of criminal activity linked to cell phones. In one case, in January
2011, an inmate at a federal institution was sentenced to an additional 14
years in prison for running an identity-theft ring using a contraband cell
phone. This inmate and his accomplices obtained personal information on
credit card holders at various retailers and impersonated these account
holders to fraudulently purchase over $254,000 worth of merchandise.
In addition, officials from seven of our selected eight states provided
examples of specific criminal actions that occurred as a result of inmate
cell phone use. For example, in October 2008, a death row inmate in a
Texas state prison used a smuggled cell phone to threaten a state
Senator and his family. This same phone was also used by a number of
other inmates within the prison. In addition, in 2007, an inmate in a
Maryland detention center ordered the murder of a state witness via a cell
phone. In 2005, an inmate in a New Jersey state prison—serving time for
previously shooting at two police officers—used a contraband cell phone
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to order the murder of his girlfriend, who had previously testified against
him during a trial.
BOP and officials in selected states acknowledged that definitively linking
the possession of a contraband cell phone to an individual can be
challenging. For example, officials we interviewed from BOP’s
Correctional Programs Division, and two of the four BOP institutions that
we interviewed say that cell phones are often found on the grounds of an
institution or in “common areas” such as bathrooms or television rooms
rather than in the possession of an inmate directly. Cell phones are also
frequently passed around and used by several different inmates, making
it difficult to link the ownership of a cell phone to a particular inmate.
In order to gain useful information—such as phone numbers or text
messages—that could link a cell phone to an individual inmate or related
criminal activity, BOP conducts forensic investigations of the cell phones
it confiscates.

BOP and Selected
States Have
Implemented Cell
Phone Search and
Detection
Technologies, but
BOP Could Evaluate
Technologies Better
and Increase
Coordination

BOP and the eight selected states we contacted have taken steps to
address growing contraband cell phone smuggling and use in their
correctional institutions, but BOP could evaluate existing technologies
better to maximize its investment decisions. BOP has tested multiple cell
phone detection technologies; however, it has not developed evaluation
plans to measure the effectiveness of these tests. Moreover, BOP has
shared information with state agencies to some extent on strategies for
combating contraband cell phones, but BOP’s regional offices could
pursue more direct connections with states in accordance with relevant
BOP policy that encourages them to do so. By enhancing information
sharing, BOP could gain knowledge from states’ practices and lessons
learned and likewise, states’ practices could be better informed by
learning more about BOP’s efforts related to cell phone detection.

BOP and Selected States
Have Implemented a
Variety of Strategies to
Prevent and Minimize Cell
Phone Smuggling and Use

BOP and officials from all eight selected state correctional departments
we contacted have developed multiple methods for preventing cell
phones from entering prison institutions and being used by inmates.
These include search procedures for visitors and correctional staff as well
as cell phone detection technologies, which identify the use of cell phones
once they have reached the inmate population.

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Through policy memorandums and program statements that govern its
protocols, BOP has implemented agencywide screening procedures for
all visitors, contractors, and staff for detecting contraband items. These
procedures include the use of x-ray screening machines, walk-through
metal detectors, and hand-held metal detectors. Though these
procedures are not cell phone specific, BOP officials told us they
represent a concerted effort in keeping contraband out of prisons in
general. See appendix II for more information on the direction that BOP
provides for screening of visitors, staff, and inmates.
In addition to its search procedures, BOP has employed technology to
stem the rise in cell phone smuggling. In particular, BOP has
implemented two large-scale sensor-based cell phone detection systems
at two of its prison institutions, a technology BOP officials described as
being the only effective solution at this time. The Radio Frequency (RF)
sensor based system detects the presence of cell phones and displays
their approximate location using a monitored computer screen.
In April 2007, BOP installed the original prototype sensor system in three
housing units within one building, which included the purchase of a
server, computer work station, and switches. According to BOP officials,
the manufacturer provided the actual sensors and software at minimal
costs in order to assist in research and development for the project, while
other fiber and wiring were obtained from surplus supplies at no cost to
BOP. Additionally, BOP officials told us that BOP staff installed the sensor
system, helping cut costs that an outside party might have otherwise
charged for installation. 41 Because of these factors, BOP officials said a
similar system installed by a contractor at other prison institutions would
be more expensive. For example, BOP officials told us that it cost them
approximately seven times more than the original system to install
equipment for a newer-generation version of BOP’s prototype RF sensor
system at a second prison institution in December 2010, even though
BOP officials were able to install it themselves as they had in the first
location. According to BOP officials, the second system covers 11
housing units in both an institution and prison camp, and is also
configured so that officials throughout the prison can view areas of cell

41

BOP officials told us this installation was done without using conduit for wiring, secure
boxes for sensors, and without connecting the system to BOP’s network.

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GAO-11-893 Inmate Phone Use

phone detection, which BOP officials said accounted for a higher
installation cost. 42
We found that all eight of the selected state officials we interviewed cited
using entrance screening practices such as use of walk-through metal
detectors or x-ray machines at their secure institutions; and, six of these
states are using different cell phone detection techniques that BOP has
not yet employed, such as canines 43 and managed access. 44
Additional information on cell phone detection strategies tested or
deployed by BOP and selected state DOCs—as well as these officials’
perspectives on their utility—is deemed law enforcement sensitive and
not included in this report.

BOP Has Steps in Place to
Identify Promising Cell
Phone Detection
Technologies, but Lacks
Sound Evaluation Plans

BOP takes several steps to determine which cell phone detection
technologies to test. BOP’s OST is tasked with identifying promising
technology in the area of cell phone detection, and all five OST staff
share responsibility for testing and evaluating technology security
initiatives throughout BOP. To make determinations about which
technology BOP should test, OST officials told us that they familiarize
themselves through working groups with other federal and state
organizations and discussions with all interested product vendors with
equipment that other federal or state correctional entities use. OST
officials also explained that they have developed criteria over several
years that they believe should be met before they will test any given
approach. 45 These four criteria are:

42

Due to BOP concerns over revealing the locations where this detection system is in use,
we have omitted the specific BOP locations examining the RF sensor-based system.

43

Six of the state DOCs we interviewed reported using cell phone detection canines.

44

Two of the state DOCs we interviewed reported using a managed access system.

45

According to OST officials, these criteria have been modified over time and were most
recently collapsed into four dimensions in preparation of NTIA’s report. Analysis for NTIA’s
report began soon after December 2009, when Congress directed the NTIA, in
coordination with BOP, the FCC, and NIJ, to develop a plan to investigate and evaluate
how wireless jamming, detection, and other technologies might be utilized for law
enforcement and corrections applications in federal and state prison facilities. See U.S.
Department of Commerce, Contraband Cell Phones in Prisons: Possible Wireless
Technology Solutions (December 2010).

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1. The equipment must work without affecting or collecting information
from the general public located outside the correctional facilities’
secure perimeter.
2. The solution should have no legal restrictions. 46
3. The equipment must work with all cellular phone protocols. 47
4. The overall cost of equipment and installation must be fair and
reasonable. 48
Once OST is satisfied that the technology meets most of these criteria,
OST tests the equipment at BOP headquarters and then sends it out to
one or more prison institutions for testing by staff in a prison environment.
Once tested, institutional staff then provide OST with a brief written
response or phone call regarding their views of the equipment’s
effectiveness. Once OST receives feedback from the prison institution,
OST may then send the equipment to another institution for further testing
by prison staff.

Source: BOP.

While BOP has put the above criteria in place, it does not have a sound
evaluation plan that includes, among other dimensions, criteria or
standards for determining how well the technology works. OST officials
told us that they rely on the process discussed above to make decisions
regarding the effectiveness of cell phone detection equipment, but they
acknowledged that the tests each institution conducts may vary in scope
and rigor and that they have no evaluation plan to govern this process.
OST officials told us they previously attempted to distribute consistent
evaluation questions to institutional staff testing each technology, using
an “Initial Technology Assessment” form, but that OST abandoned this
practice because it rarely received the form back from prison institutions.
Further, officials told us that when institutions do respond with technology
test results, OST receives very little feedback. OST officials told us that
institutional staff have limited time and resources for assisting them with

Example of hand-held RF cell phone
detector tested by BOP.
46

For example, some cell phone detection equipment captures dialing, routing,
addressing, or signaling information, and BOP would have to obtain a court order to use
this equipment.
47

In other words, equipment must work with the phones of all cell phone operators,
including AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, and other smaller operators.
48

BOP considers “reasonable” cost to be a subjective determination based on common
sense value of the equipment, weighing such factors as effectiveness of the equipment,
relative cost compared to similar equipment, coverage area, perceived threat, risks and
consequences, and alternative solutions.

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cell phone detection technology evaluations because such testing is in
addition to their normal duties. Also, OST has stated that some
institutions are more eager than others for the opportunity to test new
technology; thus, some institutions may not have the interest or expertise
to contribute information to a technology assessment. In addition,
according to OST, the role of the individual conducting the test can vary
by institution. Specifically, equipment could be tested by a correctional
officer, a lieutenant, or a computer specialist, a situation that OST officials
said results in inconsistent testing methods because these individuals
have different skills and knowledge levels. In addition, the OST official
tasked with addressing contraband cell phone detection issues told us
that BOP regions and local prison institutions regularly test cell phone
detection devices and approaches, as well as other types of equipment,
without OST’s knowledge and most often do not inform OST of their
findings. For example, the official explained that in some instances,
vendors notify OST of technology tests conducted at local prison
institutions that OST was unaware of at the time. GAO’s internal control
standards require that an agency’s organizational structure clearly define
key areas of authority and responsibility, and establish appropriate lines
of reporting. 49 Thus, while OST applies its criteria to screen new
technologies before sending them to prison institutions for testing, it lacks
clearly defined responsibilities for the individuals conducting tests and
sound evaluation methods to fully evaluate such technologies once
institutional testing has been completed. As a result, BOP has
implemented—and discarded—some technologies without fully evaluating
them and documenting results as discussed below.
We have previously reported that for tests of new technology, a sound,
well-developed and documented evaluation plan should include:
1. well-defined, clear, and measurable objectives;
2. criteria or standards for determining program performance;
3. clearly articulated methodology, including sound sampling methods,
determination of appropriate sample size for the evaluation design,
and a strategy for comparing the pilot results with other efforts;
4. a clear plan that details the type and source of data necessary to
evaluate the pilot, methods for data collection, and the timing and
frequency of data collection; and

49

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.

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5. a detailed data analysis plan to track the program’s performance and
evaluate the final results of the project. 50
Certain details on the tests OST has conducted and the conclusions it
has drawn have not been included here due to law enforcement
sensitivities.
OST officials explained that BOP has a policy, called Pilot Initiatives,
Approval and Evaluation, that identifies numerous criteria that should be
followed when implementing and evaluating pilot programs. 51 The policy
includes practices such as defining goals and objectives, developing an
evaluation plan, describing costs for the program, and identifying
advantages and disadvantages related to a broader implementation of the
technology, all of which align with established best practices. According to
OST officials, however, they have not designated the testing phase of any
cell phone technologies as “a pilot” by the definition included in their
policy, and OST does not apply the policy to any of their testing. 52 In our
view, BOP could benefit by using its pilot initiative-evaluation criteria as a
best practice when evaluating cell phone detection tests to better inform
decisions about whether investments on a larger scale are warranted.

Source: GAO.

Ground Observation Reconnaissance
Transmitter (GORT) in use at one BOP
facility to detect movement of contraband
over security fence.

When we requested reports and documentation—including evaluation
plans and reports—resulting from tests of the technologies that OST
explained to us, officials sometimes provided us with brief overviews of
testing methods that did not meet best practices. For example, OST told
us it has not subjected its RF sensor system—currently deployed in two
institutions—to any final assessment or evaluation outlining when and
how BOP would determine whether adopting this system on a wider scale
would be feasible and effective. On the other hand, in one instance, OST
officials told us BOP did adhere to more rigorous evaluation procedures.
Specifically, with assistance from OST, one prison institution has
deployed the Ground Observation Reconnaissance Transmitter (GORT)

50

GAO-09-45 and GAO-09-399.

51

BOP Program Statement P1066.04: Pilot Initiatives, Approval and Evaluation (Nov. 14,
2007).

52

OST officials told us that pilot projects require extensive oversight and that such a
designation is only given to new technology with a broad, high-level scope. Although
BOP’s RF sensor-based system may have qualified as a pilot project if tested by OST,
implementation of the system at the regional and institutional level required no such
assessment.

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in one of its institutions. When testing the GORT system, officials
identified system goals and objectives; identified criteria for determining
program performance; completed a final product evaluation that
documented advantages and disadvantages of the system; and
concluded that GORT successfully reduced smuggling of contraband
including cell phones at the test location. OST officials told us the
assessment of the GORT differed from assessments of its other
technologies because the level of evaluation performed was at the
discretion of the local prison institution implementing the system. OST
officials agree that developing a sound evaluation approach that could be
used by prison institution staff for testing cell phone detection
technologies would strengthen BOP’s approach for combating the issue
of contraband cell phones in prisons. Having an evaluation plan for
selected cell phone detection technology that follows BOP pilot evaluation
criteria or other best practices could help BOP more effectively measure
how well each piece of equipment functions. Moreover, these steps could
better allow OST to better inform BOP leadership’s decisions regarding
the adoption of such technology and the associated resource allocations.

BOP Could Take Steps to
Enhance Information
Sharing with States

BOP reports that OST collaborates with various state-level agencies, but
has opportunities to improve coordination between its regional offices and
states in identifying effective strategies and technologies for combating
contraband cell phones in prisons. 53 BOP recognizes the importance of
outreach with state and local entities and has developed a policy
statement governing such interaction. 54 This policy notes that
“communication and understanding among [BOP] institutions and regional
offices and their local communities will be enhanced by formal and
informal contacts between [BOP] staff and local agencies and
organizations.” It further states that “Regional Directors and Wardens
shall include in their lists of annual accomplishments a summary of all
organizations with which their institutions or regional offices are formally
associated, including a general statement about any significant
contribution to [BOP] operations or criminal justice relationships that have

53
BOP’s six regional offices oversee the operations of the institutions in their respective
regions. Among other things, regional office staff provide management and technical
assistance to institutional personnel.
54

BOP Program Statement 1400.04: Contacts with Other Agencies and Organizations
(Sept. 9, 1996).

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resulted from those associations.” Further, we have previously reported
on the importance of interagency coordination and information sharing
across federal, regional, state, and local government entities. 55 We also
previously reported that making efficient use of security technology to
supplement and reinforce other security measures is a key practice for
protecting federal institutions, but that the type of technology to use
should be carefully analyzed. 56
OST, located at BOP headquarters in Washington, D.C., reported
coordination with state-level agencies through direct information sharing,
professional organizations, and established working groups. In particular,
ASCA officials told us BOP coordinates with their group through panels,
demonstrations, and briefings. For example, OST also participates in
multiple NIJ/NLECTC technology working groups (TWG) involving cell
phone detection. 57 OST also coordinates with representatives from
multiple state DOCs on an individual basis after establishing relationships
as members of professional organizations, committees, and working
groups. For example, OST provided the New York correctional
department with 30-day access to a cell phone detection device after the
state demonstrated interest in the technology. According to OST, BOP
has also shared information on its practices for detecting contraband cell
phones with states such as Pennsylvania, Texas, and Florida.
We corroborated BOP headquarters’ level of coordination with these
groups and multiple state DOCs. At the regional level, we found that

55

GAO, Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency
Preparedness, GAO-04-1009 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004).

56

GAO-05-49.

57
A TWG is a practitioner-based committee of 10 to 30 experienced practitioners from
local, state, tribal, and federal agencies and laboratories associated with a particular NIJ
technology investment portfolio. Three of NIJ’s TWGs are concerned with, among other
things, the issue of cell phones in correctional institutions. OST participates in the
Institutional Corrections TWG and the Sensors and Surveillance TWG, but not the
Communications TWG. The Institutional Corrections TWG is particularly interested in
contraband detection and interdiction of wireless devices. NIJ officials report that, with
respect to cell phones, this TWG is currently focused on exploring smaller-scale cell
phone detection technology, such as hand-held devices, due in part to limited funds
available to many state and local correctional departments. The Sensors and Surveillance
TWG is exploring various cell phone detection technologies. The Communications TWG is
interested in controlled (or managed) access, which would still allow the lawful use of cell
phones in prison.

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BOP’s regional offices had limited coordination with states regarding
contraband cell phone issues. For example, one BOP regional director
stated that his region coordinated with officials from ASCA, but said he
has not coordinated with state entities because such coordination occurs
through BOP officials in headquarters. Another regional director
concurred, reporting that nobody in his region participates in any task
forces, working groups, or other collaborative efforts with federal or state
entities concerning cell phone detection issues because this should be
occurring through headquarters’ outreach. As discussed earlier, some
states have taken efforts that BOP does not currently use to combat
contraband cell phones, such as canine detection units. Thus, enhanced
coordination could allow BOP to better leverage information on potentially
employing these state efforts to combat contraband cell phones.
Likewise, while BOP has shared practices with states in the past, OST
officials agreed that BOP could improve coordination efforts by its
regional offices as well.
In addition, while BOP policy states that “over the years, formal and
informal employee relationships with organizations, such as advisory
committees, law enforcement coordinating councils, criminal justice
councils, and state and local planning organizations, have enhanced
[BOP] operations,” we found limited BOP regional-office interaction with
state and local government agencies concerning contraband cell-phone
smuggling and use. 58 For example, according to BOP officials, Regional
Directors and Wardens annually prepare a Performance Work Plan that
lists, among other things, efforts made in establishing relations and
collaborating with other state and local correctional and law enforcement
entities in their communities. However, BOP officials have informed us
that these plans do not provide a level of detail—such as including
lessons learned on cell-phone-smuggling approaches and the
technologies to address them—to inform BOP’s central office of the
nature of issues discussed. Our review of the three work plans with which
BOP provided us confirmed the limitations in the information they
contained. As we have previously reported, by having a process in place
to obtain and share information on potential threats, agencies can better
understand the risk they face and more effectively determine what
preventive measures should be implemented. 59 Regularly reaching out to

58

BOP Program Statement 1400.04.

59

GAO-05-49.

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coordinate with key stakeholders, particularly at the state level, to learn
about their cell phone–combating efforts could help improve BOP’s ability
to address cell phone smuggling and use in prisons. Conversely, BOP’s
outreach and coordination with states at the regional level—to highlight
practices BOP believes are useful—could help inform state practices as
well. Further, keeping records of these exchanges, through Performance
Work Plans for example, could help the regional offices provide BOP with
greater problem-solving information by leveraging states’ experience in
addressing contraband cell phones.

Conclusions

BOP provides a variety of options to its inmates for making phone calls to
friends and families—at rates that compare favorably to correctional
institutions operated by states and other federal agencies. Nevertheless,
the number of contraband cell phones in prisons is rising. As documented
in our discussions with federal and state officials, the illicit use of cell
phones can pose a danger to staff and inmates, as well as to the public at
large. BOP has reviewed a number of technologies and adopted largescale sensor detection systems at two of its institutions in an attempt to
combat this problem. BOP does have opportunities, however, to enhance
assessments of how well these technologies can work. For example, if
BOP formulated well-developed and well-documented plans for testing
and evaluating cell phone detection and defeat technologies—including
the establishment of goals, objectives, and criteria—and defined
evaluation-related responsibilities for individuals performing the tests, it
would be better positioned to make decisions before adopting these
technologies. BOP also has opportunities to better leverage what states
are learning in their attempts to better detect and prevent cell phone
smuggling. In particular, if BOP encouraged its regional offices to improve
coordination with its local counterparts, BOP could be better positioned to
track and monitor what states were experimenting with and what their
evaluation results have been. By taking these steps, BOP could make
more well-informed decisions as it moves forward in addressing the
growing safety and security threats posed by contraband cell phones in
its prisons.

Recommendations for
Executive Action

To help BOP respond more effectively to contraband cell phone
challenges, we recommend that the Attorney General direct the BOP
Director to take the following three actions:


Direct OST to formulate evaluation plans that both support a
consistent approach to testing cell phone detection technologies and

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strengthen decisions about deploying cell phone detection projects.
Such plans should include key characteristics of successful evaluation
methods, such as defining measurable objectives and including a
detailed data analysis plan. The plans should also clearly define
evaluation-related responsibilities for the individuals conducting the
test at each institution.

Agency Comments



Develop a policy to require that regions and institutions apply OST’s
evaluation plans when testing the technology that OST believes may
be viable for detecting or combating contraband cell phones. This
policy should also require OST to provide the results of these
evaluations to BOP leadership to better inform BOP-wide decisions
regarding the adoption of such technology.



Enhance regional office collaboration with other federal, state, and
local organizations; document what is learned; and share it throughout
BOP to enhance agencywide knowledge of key efforts to prevent or
minimize cell phone smuggling in prisons.

We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to DOJ, and
also requested comments from the Department of Commerce, FCC, and
Department of Defense on nonsensitive draft excerpts related to these
agencies. The agencies did not provide written comments. However, in
an e-mail received July 12, 2011, the DOJ liaison stated that DOJ
concurred with our recommendations. DOJ, FCC, and Department of
Defense provided written technical comments, which we incorporated into
the report, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Attorney General, Secretaries
of Commerce and Defense and the Chairman of the Federal
Communications Commission. In addition, this report will also be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

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GAO-11-893 Inmate Phone Use

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
David Maurer at (202) 512-8777 or maurerd@gao.gov or Mark Goldstein
at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report
are listed in appendix III.

David C. Maurer
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues

Mark L. Goldstein
Director, Physical Infrastructure

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Appendix I: National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) Observations
on Technologies to Combat Contraband Cell
Phones
Appendix I: National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA)
Observations on Technologies to Combat
Contraband Cell Phones

In 2010, NTIA sought out and received public comments on “technologies
that would significantly reduce or eliminate contraband cell phone use
without negatively affecting commercial wireless and public safety
services … in areas surrounding prisons.” 1 NTIA analyzed the comments
received and reported its observations on advantages and disadvantages
of each of these technologies, as illustrated in table 5.
Table 5: NTIA Observations on Technologies Designed to Reduce or Eliminate Contraband Cell Phone Use
Technology
Jamming

Managed access

Detection

NTIA observations
Jamming could potentially cause interference to cell phone signals outside of a prison institution, unless
properly designed.

Jamming interferes with 911 and authorized calls and violates the Communications Act of 1934 when
a
performed by nonfederal entities.

Implementation costs vary with the complexity of the prison site.

Managed access systems have the potential to cause interference outside of the prison or to adjacent
bands unless properly designed.

These systems permit 911 and known authorized calls, but require FCC approval and carrier consent.

Costs can vary based on the complexity of the prison site.

Detection systems are “passive” in that they do not transmit signals, and thus do not cause interference
to phone calls.

Such systems protect 911 and authorized calls and, unless used for data gathering for law enforcement
intelligence, raise no regulatory or legal issues.

Costs can vary based on the complexity of the prison site and sophistication of the technology used (e.g.,
simple hand-held devices would involve a lower cost than a prison-wide sensor-based detection system).


Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Department of Commerce information.

Note: Information was taken from U.S. Department of Commerce report, Contraband Cell Phones in
Prisons: Possible Wireless Technology Solutions (December 2010).
a

Specifically, the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, provides that “[n]o person shall willfully
or maliciously interfere with or cause interference to any radio communications of any station licensed
or authorized by or under this Act or operated by the United States Government.” 47 U.S.C. § 333.
This particular prohibition related to interference does not apply directly to U.S. Government
agencies. Nonfederal spectrum use is managed by the Federal Communications Commission while
spectrum use by U.S. Government agencies is managed by the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA). As a general matter, NTIA’s policy reflects the limitation with
respect to the prevention of intentional harmful interference to licensed or authorized users of radio
communications. See Manual of Regulations and Procedures for Federal Radio Frequency
Management, § 2.3.6. In light of this, NTIA has authorized spectrum use by U.S. Government
agencies that results in intentional harmful interference only in limited national security instances,
such as by DOJ for an electronic countermeasure in response to threats of radio-controlled
improvised explosive devices.

1

Preventing Contraband Cell Phone Use in Prisons, 75 Fed. Reg. 26733-01 (May 12,
2010).

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Appendix II: BOP’s Policy Memorandums and
Program Statements Governing EntranceScreening Protocols at Prison Institutions

Appendix II: BOP’s Policy Memorandums and
Program Statements Governing EntranceScreening Protocols at Prison Institutions
Table 6 describes BOP memorandums or program statements related to
entrance-screening procedures for staff and visitors at BOP institutions.
Table 6: BOP Guidance on Entrance-Screening Procedures and Their Relation to Cell Phone Detection
BOP memorandum or program statement Purpose

Relation to cell phone detection

Program Statement P5510.12: Searching,
Detaining, or Arresting Visitors to Bureau
Ground and Facilities (January 2008).

Provides BOP staff
procedures and guidance for
searching visitors at federal
prison institutions.

This policy identifies telephones as a prohibited item and
outlines how to conduct screening for identifying metallic
contraband items such as cell phones. BOP officials said
federal prisons generally experience fewer cell phone
confiscations than state prisons in part because of BOP’s
standardized screening procedures.

Memorandum: Electronic Searches of
Bureau of Prisons Staff (November 2007).

Describes the entrancescreening requirements for
all BOP staff entering a
prison. BOP told us prior to
this, BOP staff members
were not screened for
contraband.

BOP’s policy change for screening staff was first agreed
to and signed on November 8, 2007. Additional screening
guidance was then provided on January 28, 2008, as part
of this memorandum.
BOP staff must be screened using electronic equipment
such as walk-through metal detectors, which are used for
detecting metallic contraband items like cell phones. The
policy also details the secure storage procedures for
employees who commute via public transportation and
carry a cell phone.

Memorandum: Staff Entrance Procedures
Additional Guidance (January 2008).

Memorandum: Screening with Walk-Through Provides BOP
BOP’s Office of Security Technology provided
Metal Detectors - Staff, Visitors, and Inmates standardization on the use of standardized screening equipment guidance to all BOP
(January 9, 2008).
walk-through metal detectors institutions with this memorandum.
for screening.
Source: GAO analysis of BOP data.

Figure 4 provides examples of the types of equipment BOP uses to
screen staff and visitors entering BOP institutions, as well as inmates on
institution grounds.

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Appendix II: BOP’s Policy Memorandums and
Program Statements Governing EntranceScreening Protocols at Prison Institutions

Figure 4: BOP Screening Equipment
X-ray screening machine

.

Walk-thru metal detector

Hand-held metal detector

BOSS Chaira

•

-.

Sources: BOP (X-ray machine, walk-thru metal detector, and hand-held metal detector); and GAO (BOSS chair).
a

A BOSS Chair is a Body Orifice Security Scanner that detects metal objects inside inmates’ body
cavities.

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Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff
Acknowledgments

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff
Acknowledgments
GAO Contacts

David Maurer, (202) 512-8777 or maurerd@gao.gov
Mark Goldstein, (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov

Staff
Acknowledgments

In addition to the contacts named above, Mike Clements and Joy Booth,
Assistant Directors, and Adam Couvillion, Analyst-in-Charge, managed
this assignment. Raymond Griffith and Nancy Zearfoss made significant
contributions to the work. David Alexander, Madhav Panwar, and Ramon
Rodriguez assisted with design and methodology. Willie Commons III
provided legal support and Katherine Davis provided assistance in report
preparation.

(440996)

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