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Global Tel Link v. Federal Communications Commission and United States of America, DC, Amicus Brief for Respondents, Telephone Contact During Incarceration, 2016

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USCA Case #15-1461

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ORAL ARGUMENT NOT YET SCHEDULED
No. 15-1461, and consolidated cases
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

GLOBAL TEL*LINK, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, et al.,
Respondents.

ON PETITIONS FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

BRIEF OF INTERVENORS NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS
INTERNATIONAL CORP.
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
Glenn S. Richards, Esq.
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP
1200 Seventeenth Street NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 663-8000
Glenn.richards@pillsburylaw.com

September 29, 2016

Counsel for Network Communications International Corp.
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CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES
Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 28(a)(1), intervenors Network
Communications International Corp. (“NCIC”) certify as follows:
A. Parties and Amici
All parties and intervenors appearing before this Court are listed in the
petitioners’ briefs. The states of Minnesota, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Mexico,
New York, Washington, Washington D.C, the County of Santa Clara, and the City
and County of San Francisco are amici curiae in support of respondents.
B. Rulings Under Review
The ruling under review is the FCC’s Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling
Services, Second Report and Order and Third Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, WC Dkt. No. 12-375, 30 FCC Rcd. 12763 (2015).
C. Related Cases
The consolidated cases in this action are Case Nos. 15-1461, 15-1498, 161012, 16-1029, 16-1038, 16-1046, and 16-1057. In addition, a prior related action
involves some of the same parties and similar issues: Securus Technologies, Inc. v.
FCC, No. 13-1280 and consolidated cases (D.C. Cir.).

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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and D.C. Circuit Rule
26.1, NCIC hereby submits the following corporate disclosure statement:
NCIC does not have any parent companies and there are no publicly-held
companies with a 10% or greater ownership interest in NCIC. NCIC is an inmate
calling service provider that participated in and is affected by the underlying FCC
rulemaking being challenged by Petitioners.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Page

CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES ............. i
A. Parties and Amici ............................................................................................ i
B. Rulings Under Review .................................................................................... i
C. Related Cases .................................................................................................. i
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ........................................................ ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iv
GLOSSARY...............................................................................................................v
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS .........................................................................v
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........................................1
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................4
I. Petitioner Arguments That The Order Prevents ICS Providers From Receiving
Fair Compensation Are Without Merit .................................................................4
A. The Order’s Lower Rates And Fees Will Increase Call Volume And Will
Not Reduce Revenue ..................................................................................4
B. The Actions Of ICS Providers Indicate They Will Be Fairly Compensated
Under The Order.........................................................................................7
C. ICS Provider Arguments That Predict Harm From A Lack Of Change-OfLaw Provisions In ICS Contracts Are Unsubstantiated .............................9
II. Facility Costs Are Sufficiently Built Into The Rate Caps ..................................12
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................14

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

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Page(s)

Statutes
47 U.S.C. § 276 ..........................................................................................................3
Regulations
See Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, WC Docket No. 12-375, 27 FCC Rcd 16629 (2012) .....................11
Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, Report and Order and Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, WC Dkt. No. 12-375, 28 FCC Rcd 14107
(2013)....................................................................................................................11
Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, Second Report and Order and
Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, WC Dkt. No. 12-375, 30
FCC Rcd. 12763 (2015) ................................................................................... 1-13
Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, Order on Reconsideration, WC Dkt.
No 12-375, FCC 16-102, (2016)………………………………………3,4,7,8,12,13
Other Materials
Alabama Public Service Commission, Generic Proceeding Considering the
Promulgation of Telephone Rules Governing Inmate Calling Service,
Further Order Adopting Revised Inmate Phone Service Rules, Docket No.
15957, ¶ 6.20 (Dec. 9, 2014) ..................................................................................5
Global Tel*Link (“GTL”), Appeal and Protest of GA Dept. of Corrections ERequest for Proposal No. 46700-DOC0000669……………………………………8
Securus Technologies, Revenue Share Proposal – Best and Final Offer,
Proposal No. 46700-DOC0000669, GA Dept. of Corrections (March 1,
2016). ......................................................................................................................8

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GLOSSARY
2013 Order

Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, Report and
Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, WC
Dkt. No. 12-375, 28 FCC Rcd 14107 (2013)

Communications Act

The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151 et seq.

FCC

Federal Communications Commission

ICS

Inmate Calling Services

ICS Provider Brief

Joint Brief for the ICS Carrier Petitioners

JA

Joint Appendix

NCIC

Network Communications International Corporation

Order

Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, Second
Report and Order and Third Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, WC Dkt. No. 12-375, 30 FCC Rcd. 12763
(2015)

Reconsideration Order

Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, Order on
Reconsideration, WC Dkt. No 12-375, FCC 16-102,
(2016)

State and Local Brief

Brief of State and Local Government Petitioners
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

Pertinent statutes and regulations have been reproduced in the Joint Brief for
the ICS Carrier Petitioners and the Brief for Respondents Federal Communications
Commission.

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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
NCIC 1 supports the FCC’s Order, including the decision to cap rates for
intrastate calling and ancillary services. 2 The rates adopted by the FCC balance the
diverse interests of inmates, their families, correctional facilities, and ICS
providers, who will continue to receive adequate compensation while ensuring that
inmates and families pay reasonable rates. NCIC understands that the vast
majority of inmates will rejoin society, which makes rehabilitation an important
function of the correctional system. Without rehabilitation, the correctional system
is simply a place to warehouse people until they are released into our communities.
Communication with loved ones promotes rehabilitation.3 As a result, encouraging
inmate communication with loved ones through reasonable rates for
communications services is a crucial part of the rehabilitation process.4

1

NCIC, based in Longview, Texas, was established in 1995 and provides inmate
calling services in the United States and 12 other countries. In the United States,
NCIC provides direct and wholesale services to more than 600 city, county, parish,
and state jails in 43 states.
2

Revenue from ancillary services, which is used to cover overhead expenses such
as credit card transaction fees, customer service, labor costs, and collections, is not
shared with correctional facilities. Ancillary fees boost ICS providers’ per minute
revenue. Based on NCIC’s experience, the per-minute value of ancillary fees is
$0.03 - $0.10 per minute using the Order’s ancillary fee structure.
3

See Order, Clyburn Statement at 195, J.A.__.

4

See Order ¶¶ 3-5, J.A.__.
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Reasonable ICS rates have other public interest benefits as well. They
support cost-effective inmate access to counsel,5 lead to lower recidivism, 6 and
increase the likelihood that inmates and their families will stay together after
reentry into society. 7 All of these benefits save taxpayer money. 8
Prior to the Order, ICS providers offered jails and prisons substantial site
commissions to win contracts, but continued to make significant profits from
exorbitant calling rates and ancillary fees. 9 While many state public service
commissions capped intrastate ICS rates, these caps were often subverted by ICS
providers. Indeed, some ICS providers billed calls at rates as high as $14.99 per
call, 10 but by billing the calls through entities that are neither certified nor
incorporated in the state, they avoided regulatory scrutiny. Compounding the
problem for inmates and their families were ancillary fees that were rarely, if ever,
5

See Order ¶ 93, J.A.__.

6

See Order ¶ 4, J.A.__.

7

See Order ¶¶ 3-4, J.A.__.

8

See Order ¶ 4, J.A.__ (“If telephone contact is made more affordable, we will
help ensure that former inmates are not sent home as strangers, which reduces both
their chances of returning to prison or jail and the attendant burden on society of
housing, feeding, and caring for additional inmates.”).
9

See Letter from Thomas M. Dethlefs, Associate General Counsel, CenturyLink,
to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375, J.A.__ (filed Aug.
28, 2014) (stating as an explanation for its agreement to pay a 96 percent site
commission, that “bidders were obliged to utilize ancillary fees to cover costs that
otherwise could not be recovered in per-minute rates after deducting the County’s
required commissions.”).
10

Order ¶158, J.A.__.
2

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regulated, by federal or state authorities. The Order provides a regulatory solution
for inmates and their families who cannot otherwise choose their communication
service provider. It does so in two important and interrelated ways.
First, it provides consumers with reasonable rates and fees, while allowing
ICS providers to receive fair compensation. The ICS Provider Brief disagrees, and
predicts that the FCC rate caps will result in financial ruin for ICS providers.11
The ICS provider predictions are without merit because increased call volume will
mitigate the effects of lower rates. The subsequent actions of ICS providers
contrast with their arguments before the FCC and this Court.
ICS providers also predict that they will be locked into financially untenable
contracts because they do not include change-of-law provisions. This is also not
borne out by the facts. Changes to ICS contracts are relatively common, and these
contracts typically include provisions that accommodate renegotiations or
amendments.
Second, the rate caps will prevent ICS providers from offering facilities
excessive site commissions to win ICS contracts, and passing those costs on to
consumers. Instead, facilities will receive reasonable compensation under the
Order, especially following adoption of the higher rates in the Reconsideration
Order.
11

ICS Providers Brief at 19, J.A.__; Securus brief at 5, J.A.__.
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ARGUMENT
I.

Petitioner Arguments That The Order Prevents ICS Providers From
Receiving Fair Compensation Are Without Merit
Section 276 of the Communications Act directs the FCC to ensure ICS

providers “are fairly compensated for each and every completed intrastate and
interstate call using their payphone.”12 The Order states that the introduction of
rate caps and lower per-minute rates will result in increased call volumes and
reported call revenues to jails and prisons, ensuring ICS providers’ continued
receipt of fair compensation for the services they provide. 13 The ICS providers
predict that the Order’s rates will not result in fair compensation. 14 As discussed
below, the ICS provider predictions are without merit, especially following the
FCC’s adoption of the Reconsideration Order, which increased the rate caps by
between 18 and more than 40 percent.
A. The Order’s Lower Rates And Fees Will Increase Call Volume
And Will Not Reduce Revenue
NCIC is not the largest ICS provider, yet it is able to effectively compete
while offering the FCC prescribed lower rates. Indeed, based on NCIC’s
experience implementing rate reductions across the country, lower prices lead to
increased call volume, which mitigates the effects of lower prices on revenue. For
12

47 U.S.C. § 276(b)(1)(A); see id. § 276(d).

13

Order ¶6, J.A.__.

14

ICS Providers Brief at 19, J.A.__; Securus brief at 5, J.A.__.
4

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example, in Alabama, where NCIC provides ICS to six of the 16 city jails (37.5
percent of the total) and 17 of the 67 county jails (25 percent of the total), NCIC
adjusted ICS rates and fees to be at or below those proposed by the Alabama
Public Service Commission (“Alabama PSC”). NCIC lowered rates in Alabama
from a flat $2.70 per call to rates ranging from $0.21 to $0.25 per minute. These
rates are comparable to the Order’s rates for jails, which range from $0.14 per
minute to $0.22 per minute depending on the size of the jail. 15 Following the rate
reduction, NCIC experienced significantly increased call volumes and revenues
were virtually unchanged. The Alabama PSC reported on the results of this rate
reduction at the Shelby County Jail in December 2014:
One of the largest jails in Alabama, the Shelby County Jail (located near
Birmingham), voluntarily adopted the [Alabama PSC’s] targeted intrastate
rates for prisons, $0.25/min and $0.21/min on October 1, 2014; a full two
years before the rates are applicable in Alabama prisons. We note that the
[Alabama PSC’s] targeted rate cap for jails is $0.25/min for collect, debit
and prepaid calls and that Shelby County adopted the lower prison rates.
NCIC, the ICS provider serving the Shelby County Jail, reports a
comparison of the usage between September and October indicates calls
have increased by 27% and that revenue is virtually unchanged. NCIC also
15

Order ¶9, J.A.__.
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reports paying reasonable site commissions to the Shelby County Jail.
Consequently, the [Alabama PSC] rejects Securus’ claim that the
concomitant payment of site commissions under our rate caps, which we
have no authority to require nor preclude, make it impossible for ICS
carriers to provide service under the rate structure the [Alabama PSC]
adopts.16
Following the Alabama PSC’s report, the volume of calls at the Shelby
County Jail continued to increase and revenue remained steady. 17 Between
September 2014 (the month immediately before NCIC introduced the lower rates)
and March 2015, the average number of calls nearly doubled, increasing from 33
calls per inmate in September 2014, to 61 calls per inmate in March 2015. 18
Furthermore, average revenue per inmate increased 1.5 percent during this
period.19
16

Alabama Public Service Commission, Generic Proceeding Considering the
Promulgation of Telephone Rules Governing Inmate Calling Service, Further
Order Adopting Revised Inmate Phone Service Rules, Docket No. 15957, ¶6.20
(Dec. 9, 2014) (emphasis added), attached to Letter from Alabama Public Service
Commission to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375,
J.A.__ (filed Jan. 29, 2015), also available at
http://www.psc.alabama.gov/telecom/Engineering/documents/APSC%20Docket
%2015957_Dec%202014%20Order.pdf.

17

See Letter from William L. Pope, President, NCIC, to Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 7, J.A.__ (filed April 16, 2015).

18

Id.

19

Id.
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The Shelby County Jail example is consistent with NCIC’s experience at
other Alabama facilities and at facilities around the country. For example, in
February 2016, after displacing a competitor at Brazos County Jail in Texas, and
lowering rates to $0.16 per minute, inmate calling increased 247 percent. In
addition, at Gregg County Jail in Texas, after displacing a competitor and lowering
rates to $0.21 per minute in April 2015, inmate calling increased by more than 300
percent.
As these examples demonstrate, NCIC’s experience is that the lowering rates
and fees increases call volume, and does not negatively impact revenue. As a
result, NCIC is confident that ICS providers will receive fair compensation under
the Order, especially following adoption of the increased rates in the
Reconsideration Order.
B. The Actions Of ICS Providers Indicate They Will Be Fairly
Compensated Under The Order
The Court should be skeptical of ICS provider predictions of financial ruin if
the Order is not overturned. To the contrary, the petitioners continue to actively
pursue contracts with bids that are at or below the Order’s rates and fees. For
example, Securus recently won a contract with the Georgia Department of
Corrections (“DOC”) with a March 1, 2016, bid that offered pre-paid collect and
debit rates at $0.11 per minute for interstate and intrastate calls, the same rates as

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those in the Order, and below the rates in the Reconsideration Order.20 The bid
also offered ancillary fees at or below the Order’s ancillary fee caps, including a
$4.75 live agent fee, which is less than the Order’s $5.95 live agent fee cap. 21 The
bid further contained a 59.6 percent site commission and a $4 million bonus. 22
Securus’ winning bid in Georgia undermines the ICS provider filings before
this Court and the FCC, which warn of financial ruin if the Order’s rates and fees
are implemented. Even Global Tel*Link (“GTL”), a signatory to the ICS Provider
Brief, recognized the hypocrisy of Securus’ bid. In its appeal and protest of the
Georgia DOC’s award to Securus, GTL stated that “Securus’ bid fl[ies] in the face
of its representations to the FCC and the D.C. Circuit.” GTL explained that, in an
ex parte meeting with the FCC, Securus stated that “if adopted, the rates and rules .
. . could be ‘a business ending event’ for the company.” 23 GTL also noted that, in
Securus’ January 27, 2016, Emergency Motion for Partial Stay, which was filed in
20

Securus Technologies, Revenue Share Proposal – Best and Final Offer, Proposal
No. 46700-DOC0000669, GA Dept. of Corrections at 5 (March 1, 2016)
(“Securus’ Georgia DOC Bid”), available at
http://ssl.doas.state.ga.us/PRSapp/bid-documents/164670046700GDC0000669198892.pdf.

21

Id. at 6.

22

Id.

23

Global Tel*Link (“GTL”), Appeal and Protest of GA Dept. of Corrections ERequest for Proposal No. 46700-DOC0000669 at 34 (quoting Notice of Permitted
Ex Parte meeting, WC Docket No. 12-375, J.A.__ (filed Oct. 7, 2015)) available at
http://ssl.doas.state.ga.us/PRSapp/bid-documents/164670046700GDC0000669198595.pdf.
8

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the D.C. Circuit only a month before its Georgia DOC bid, Securus claimed that,
under the Order’s rates and fees, it would not be able to provide certain ancillary
services such as online and automated telephone credit card processing.24 Despite
its claim, Securus included these ancillary services in its winning bid. 25
In short, Securus’ actions do not match its words. If Securus truly believes
that its business would be ruined by implementation of the Order, its bid would not
have relied on rates and fees at or below those of the Order or included ancillary
services it claimed were impossible to provide. Its actions reveal that, despite the
fervent arguments to the contrary, ICS providers will be fairly compensated under
the Order.
C. ICS Provider Arguments That Predict Harm From A Lack Of
Change-Of-Law Provisions In ICS Contracts Are
Unsubstantiated
The Order states that the new rates and fees will trigger change-of-law
provisions in ICS contracts that will allow providers to modify contracts to comply
with the new rate caps and to relieve providers from site commissions that would
be unduly onerous once the new rates and fees take effect. 26 The ICS Provider
Brief argues that some ICS contracts do not contain change-of-law provisions, and
24

Id. (citing Securus Technologies, Inc. Emergency Motion for Partial Stay of
FCC Order 15-136 Pending Review, Global Tel*Link v. FCC, Nos. 15-1461 et al.,
at 15-17, J.A.__ (Jan. 27, 2016)).

25

Securus’ Georgia DOC Bid at 5.

26

Order ¶213, J.A.__.
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that ICS providers bound to such contracts would be forced to “operate at a loss or
face potential liability for breach of contract.” 27 As an ICS provider with more
than two decades of experience with ICS contracts, NCIC can attest that this
argument grossly inflates the potential problems with changing existing contracts
to comply with new rates and fees.
Regulatory changes, whether at the state or federal level, are simply a part of
doing business for ICS providers. Amendments to contracts that result from
regulatory changes are relatively common. As a result, ICS contracts typically
include provisions that accommodate renegotiations or amendments. 28
Renegotiations by ICS providers following release of the Order are evidence of
this reality.
For example, in an affidavit, Securus’ CEO stated that “when the [Order]
was released, Securus renegotiated approximately 1500 contracts as to rates, rate
structure, surcharge elimination, and site commissions.”29 Based on Securus’
ability to renegotiate contracts, Standard and Poor’s Global Ratings raised its
financial outlook for Securus, stating that “Securus is in a better position to
27

ICS Provider Brief at 24, J.A.__.

28

Comments of GTL, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 29, J.A.__ (filed Mar. 25, 2013)
(ICS contracts “typically include change of law provisions.”).

29

Securus Technologies, Inc., Petition for Partial Stay of Order on Reconsideration
Pending Appeal, Affidavit of Richard A. Smith, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 1,
J.A.__ (filed Aug. 25, 2016).
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weather FCC regulation after renegotiating its customer contracts to raise call rates
and lower [site] commission payments made to facilities.” 30 ICS providers that
have entered into contracts without change-of-law provisions have done so at their
own risk, and have done so with specific notice of this proceeding, which began in
2012. 31
In addition, the ICS Provider Brief does not provide any specific examples
of providers that would be harmed by contracts that do not have change-of-law
provisions. At least one example of this type of contract would be expected to
prove the point. The absence of such evidence indicates that the argument is
unsubstantiated.
The ICS Provider Brief also ignores the smooth transition that took place
following the implementation of the 2013 Order’s interstate rate caps. 32 There,
ICS providers were able to adapt to the new rates with little contractual difficulty. 33
There is no reason to believe that implementation of the Order will be any
different.
30

S&P Global Ratings, Securus Holdings Inc. 'B' Rating Outlook Revised To
Stable From Negative; Ratings Affirmed (Aug. 19, 2016.)

31

See Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, WC Docket No. 12-375, 27 FCC Rcd 16629, J.A.__ (2012).

32

See Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, Report and Order and Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, WC Docket No. 12-375, 28 FCC Rcd 14107,
J.A.__ (2013).

33

Order ¶213, J.A.__.
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Facility Costs Are Sufficiently Built Into The Rate Caps
The State and Local Brief argues that facility compensation will be greatly

reduced, if not eliminated, by the FCC’s decision not to include site commissions
in its determination of the rate caps.34 It states that “without receiving any revenue
from ICS, some jails and prisons may greatly reduce ICS or eliminate it entirely.” 35
The Brief conveniently ignores the reality that site commissions were excessive
prior to the Order and that facilities will receive reasonable compensation from
ICS providers under the Order, especially following adoption of the higher rates in
the Reconsideration Order. 36
Site commissions by themselves do not lead to unreasonable ICS rates and
fees. They are simply profit sharing arrangements, where the ICS provider agrees
to provide the facility with a percentage of its profits. 37 In NCIC’s experience,
facilities do not ask ICS providers to pay more than what is economically feasible.
However, in the unbalanced, anti-consumer regulatory environment that existed
prior to the Order, ICS providers competed against each other by offering
increasingly high site commissions, sometimes as high as 96 percent, in order win

34

State and Local Brief at 48, J.A.__.

35

Id. at 52, J.A.__.

36

Order ¶127, J.A.__.

37

Id. ¶120, J.A.__.
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contracts with facilities. 38 To make up the cost of paying high site commissions,
providers charged consumers high rates and fees, charging as much as $14.99 per
call. 39 Having no choice in their ICS provider, consumers were forced to pay these
inflated prices.
The Order balances the ICS market. While the rate and fee caps will likely
have the effect of reducing the percentage of profits that ICS providers are able to
offer facilities through site commissions,40 facilities will still receive reasonable
compensation.41 For example, Securus’ March 1, 2016, winning bid with the
Georgia DOC, which offered rates and fees at or below those in the Order, and
below the rates in the Reconsideration Order, contained a 59.6 percent site
commission with a minimum monthly guaranteed payment of $325,000 ($3.9
million per year).42 The bid also included a $4 million bonus payable upon
38

See Letter from Thomas M. Dethlefs, Associate General Counsel, CenturyLink,
to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375, J.A.__ (filed Aug.
28, 2014) (stating as an explanation for its agreement to pay a 96 percent site
commission, that “bidders were obliged to utilize ancillary fees to cover costs that
otherwise could not be recovered in per-minute rates after deducting the County’s
required commissions.”).

39

Id.; Order ¶158, J.A.__.

40

Order ¶128, J.A.__ (“[W]e have addressed the harmful effects of outsized site
commissions by establishing comprehensive rate caps and caps on ancillary
service charges that may limit providers’ ability to pass site commissions through
to ICS consumers.”).

41

Id. ¶127, J.A.__.

42

Securus’ Georgia DOC Bid at 6, J.A.__.
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execution of the contract.43 Such compensation is sufficient to meet the costs of
providing ICS, which, according to the State and Local Brief, can average “over
$100,000 per month.” 44
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petitions for review should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Glenn S. Richards
Glenn S. Richards
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP
1200 Seventeenth Street NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 663-8000
Glenn.richards@pillsburylaw.com
Dated: September 29, 2016

43

Id.

44

State and Local Brief at 52, J.A.__; The Order cites further examples, including
Pennsylvania and New Hampshire, where rates are under $.06 (well below the
Order’s rate caps) yet these states are able to impose 35 percent and 20 percent
site commissions respectively. Order ¶128, J.A.__.
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32(a)
This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(7)(B) because this brief contains 3,144 words, excluding the parts of the
brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).

/s/ Glenn S. Richards
Glenn S. Richards

4834-9747-2820.v8

USCA Case #15-1461

Document #1638381

Filed: 09/29/2016

Page 22 of 22

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Glenn S. Richards, hereby certify that I have on this 29th day of
September, 2016, electronically filed the foregoing Brief of Intervenors by using
this Court’s Case Management/ Electronic Case Files system, which served a copy
on all counsel of record in these cases.

/s/ Glenn S. Richards
Glenn S. Richards

4834-9747-2820.v8