Prison Phone Justice

95 P.3d 337
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Page 1

Sanders, J., dissented, with opinion.
Supreme Court of Washington,
En Banc.
Sandy JUDD, Tara Herivel and Zuraya Wright, for
themselves, and on behalf of all similarly situated
persons, Petitioners,
v.
AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH
COMPANY; GTE Northwest, Inc.; Centurytel
Telephone Utilities, Inc.; Northwest Telecommunications, Inc. d/b/a PTI Communications, Inc.;
U.S. Pwest Communications, Inc.; T-Netix, Inc.,
Respondents.
No. 73966-8.
Argued March 9, 2004.
Decided July 29, 2004.
Background: Phone call recipients brought action
against telecommunications providers seeking injunctive relief and damages based on alleged
nondisclosure of telephone rates to those accepting
long distance collect calls placed by inmates housed
in state correctional facilities. The Superior Court,
King County, J. Kathleen Learned, J., granted one
provider's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the other claims with prejudice. Recipients
appealed. The Court of Appeals, 116 Wash.App.
761, 66 P.3d 1102, affirmed.
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Fairhurst, J., held
that:
(1) that Statute which directed Washington Utilities
and Transportation Commission (“WUTC”) to establish rules regarding appropriate disclosure of
rates did not provide independent basis, absent any
reference to WUTC or its regulations, for recipients‘ claims, and
(2) Administrative Procedure Act was sole means
to challenge validity of regulations.
Affirmed.

West Headnotes
[1] Appeal and Error 30

893(1)

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(F) Trial De Novo
30k892 Trial De Novo
30k893 Cases Triable in Appellate
Court
30k893(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Construction of a statute is a question of law
which Supreme Court reviews de novo under the
error of law standard.
[2] Telecommunications 372

935

372 Telecommunications
372III Telephones
372III(G) Rates and Charges
372k935 k. Particular Cases and Problems
in General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 372k323)
Statute which directed Washington Utilities
and Transportation Commission (“WUTC”) to establish rules to require the appropriate disclosure of
rates of certain phone service providers did not
provide independent basis, absent any reference to
WUTC or its regulations, for phone call recipients‘
direct claims against telephone companies for their
failure to make contemporaneous rate disclosures
required by regulations, as regulations, rather than
statute, require companies to make contemporaneous disclosures. West's RCWA 80.36.520.
[3] Action 13

3

13 Action
13I Grounds and Conditions Precedent
13k3 k. Statutory Rights of Action. Most
Cited Cases
When the legislature employs the words “the

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95 P.3d 337
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legislature finds,” it sets forth policy statements
that do not give rise to enforceable rights and duties.
[4] Action 13

3

13 Action
13I Grounds and Conditions Precedent
13k3 k. Statutory Rights of Action. Most
Cited Cases
Statutes 361

210

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic
Aids to Construction
361k210 k. Preamble and Recitals.
Most Cited Cases
Legislative policy statements in a statute are to
be considered in construing, interpreting, and administering the statute, and while such declarations
and recitals are not operative rules of action, they
may play an important part in determining what action shall be taken.
[5] Telecommunications 372

950

372 Telecommunications
372III Telephones
372III(G) Rates and Charges
372k946 Particular Types of Service
372k950 k. Long Distance or Interexchange. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 372k323)
In order for there to be a failure to disclose
rates charged for collect telephone calls that is actionable under the Consumer Protection Act (CPA),
the failure must violate the rules adopted by the
Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (WUTC) pursuant to the alternate operator services disclosure statute. West's RCWA 19.86.010 et
seq., 80.36.520.
[6] Telecommunications 372

894

Page 2

372 Telecommunications
372III Telephones
372III(F) Telephone Service
372k893 Administrative Procedure
372k894 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 372k323)
Administrative Procedure Act was sole means
for recipients of collect telephone calls from state
prisons to challenge validity of Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (WUTC) regulations which removed local exchange companies
from alternate operator services disclosure regulations, despite recipients‘ allegation that their claims
were exempt from Act under “money damages
only” exception; claims sought injunction, claims
sought damages outside of mere compensation for
injury, and recipients did not bring WUTC into the
suit. West's RCWA 34.05.510; 80.36.520.
[7] Telecommunications 372

947

372 Telecommunications
372III Telephones
372III(G) Rates and Charges
372k946 Particular Types of Service
372k947 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 372k950, 372k323)
Telephone company never provided long distance telephone or long distance operator services
with respect to prison inmates, but rather was limited to providing local telephone service, and thus
could not be liable in phone call recipients's action
against telecommunications providers for alleged
nondisclosure of telephone rates to those accepting
long distance collect calls placed by inmates housed
in state correctional facilities.
**338 *197 Jonathan P. Meier, Chris Robert Youtz,
Sirianni Youtz Meier & Spoonenmore, Seattle for
Petitioners.
Kelly Twiss Noonan, Seattle, for Respondent
American Telephone and Telegraph Co.

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Robert Bertelson Mitchell, Athan Emmanuel
Tramountanas, Preston Gates & Ellis LLP, Seattle,
for Respondents Centurytel **339 Telephone Utilities, Northwest Telecommunications Inc., PTI
Communications Inc.
Timothy J. O'Connell, Stoel Rives LLP, Seattle, for
Respondents GTE Nortwest Inc., Verizon Northwest Inc.
*198 Julia Parsons Clarke, Kathleen M. O'Sullivan,
Michael E. Bindas, Perkins Coie LLP, Seattle, for
Respondent Qwest Corp.
Donald H. Mullins, Badgley Mullins Law Group
PLLC, Seattle, for Respondent T-Netix Inc.
Teresa Williams Gillespie, Kirkland, for Respondent U.S. West Communications Inc.
Kendall Joy Fisher, Puget Sound Energy, Bellevue,
for Respondent Verizon Northwest Inc.
FAIRHURST, J.
Petitioners Sandy Judd, Tara Herivel and
Zuraya Wright (hereinafter collectively Judd) are
individuals who received long distance collect telephone calls from Washington prison inmates
between 1996 and 2000. Respondents Qwest Corporation (formerly U.S. West Communications,
Inc., hereinafter Qwest), Verizon Northwest, Inc.
(formerly GTE Northwest, Inc., hereinafter Verizon), and CenturyTel Telephone Utilities, Inc.
(formerly CenturyTel Telephone Utilities, Inc., and
Northwest Telecommunications, Inc., d/b/a PTI
Communications, Inc., hereinafter CenturyTel)
provided pay phone service in Washington prisons
as local exchange carriers (LECs) during those
years. Judd claims the respondents failed to disclose their long distance operator service rates to
Judd and other recipients of collect calls from inmates. According to Judd, the legislature provided a
cause of action to address this lack of disclosure in
RCW 80.36.510. Judd also purports to challenge
the validity of certain exemptions or waivers
provided in the disclosure regulations that the

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Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (WUTC) promulgated pursuant to RCW
80.36.520. Finally, Judd challenges *199 the trial
court's finding that CenturyTel did not provide long
distance telephone service in Washington prisons
during the years relevant to this lawsuit.
We reject Judd's arguments. First, RCW
80.36.510 does not establish a cause of action independent from claims based on violations of the disclosure regulations adopted by the WUTC. Second,
Judd may not challenge the WUTC's disclosure regulations in a non-Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), chapter 34.05 RCW, review proceeding. Finally, the trial court properly determined that CenturyTel provided only local telephone service to
Washington prisons.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Enacted in 1988, RCW 80.36.510, .520, and
.530 address the disclosure of rates charged by alternate operator services (AOS) companies for services incident to intrastate or interstate long distance telephone calls from nonresidential locations.
Section .510 expresses the legislature's finding that
a failure to disclose such rates, charges, or fees is a
FN1
“deceptive trade practice.”
Section .520 directs
the WUTC to promulgate rules to assure appropriFN2
ate rate disclosures by AOS companies.
Section .530 then declares that “a violation of RCW
80.36.510, 80.36.520, or 80.36.524 constitutes an
unfair or deceptive act in trade or commerce in
*200 violation of chapter 19.86 RCW, the conFN3
sumer protection act.”
FN1. RCW 80.36.510 provides, in full:
“The legislature finds that a growing number of companies provide, in a nonresidential setting, telecommunications services
necessary to long distance service without
disclosing the services provided or the rate,
charge or fee. The legislature finds that
provision of these services without disclos-

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ure to consumers is a deceptive trade practice.”
FN2. RCW 80.36.520 provides: “The utilities and transportation commission shall
by rule require, at a minimum, that any
telecommunications company, operating as
or contracting with an alternate operator
services company, assure appropriate disclosure to consumers of the provision and
the rate, charge or fee of services provided
by an alternate operator services company.” RCW 80.36.520 defines an AOS
company as “a person providing a connection to intrastate or interstate long-distance
services from places including, but not
limited to, hotels, motels, hospitals, and
customer-owned pay telephones.”
FN3. Although RCW 80.36.530 references
violations of section .524 in addition to
sections .510 and .520, the proper interpretation of section .524 is not an issue in
this case. RCW 80.36.530 also sets the
amount of damages for disclosure violations at “the cost of the service provided
plus two hundred dollars.” Plaintiffs must
prove any additional damages.
**340 As required by RCW 80.36.520, the
WUTC first promulgated AOS disclosure regulations in 1989. The WUTC subsequently amended
the regulations in 1991 and 1999. The 1991 regulations specifically exempted LECs from the definition of an AOS company and, therefore, did not require LECs to make the extra disclosures required
of other AOS companies. Former WAC
480-120-021 (1991). The WUTC eliminated the
LEC exemption when it amended the regulations in
1999 but permitted competitive telecommunications
companies to request temporary waivers to delay
compliance with the disclosure regulations. WAC
480-120-024.
Judd sued Qwest, Verizon, and CenturyTel (as
well as other companies that are no longer part of

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the suit), alleging that each company failed to disclose its rates for long distance operator assistance
services for calls placed by prison inmates. The
complaint alleged violations of RCW 80.36.520 and
.530, and sought statutory damages under section
.530. Judd also sought injunctive relief. Although
the complaint did not specifically allege a violation
of section .510 or specifically challenge the validity
of the WUTC's regulations, Judd argued the complaint encompassed these claims as well. Despite
purporting to challenge the regulations, Judd did
not bring an APA action, did not name the WUTC
as a party, and did not request that the WUTC take
any action.
The trial court concluded that RCW 80.36.510,
.520, and .530 only create a cause of action for violation of the WUTC's disclosure regulations. Although the trial court specifically invited Judd to
provide supplemental briefing on such violations,
Judd failed to allege that the telephone companies
violated any of the disclosure regulations. The trial
court also concluded that Judd could not challenge
the *201 LEC exemption to the 1991 disclosure
regulations or the temporary waiver provisions of
the 1999 disclosure regulations in a non-APA proceeding and without joining the WUTC as a party.
Finally, the trial court determined that CenturyTel
never provided services for long distance telephone
calls. Judd's claims against the telephone companies were dismissed with prejudice, and the trial
court entered final judgments pursuant to CR 54(b).
Judd timely appealed to the Court of Appeals.
A majority of the Court of Appeals panel affirmed
the trial court's conclusion that RCW 80.36.510,
.520, and .530 only create a cause of action for a violation of the WUTC's disclosure regulations. Judd
v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 116 Wash.App. 761, 769-71,
66 P.3d 1102 (2003). The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial court's conclusion that Judd could
not challenge the WUTC regulations in a non-APA
proceeding, and its conclusion that CenturyTel did
not provide services incident to long distance telephone calls. Id. at 771-74, 66 P.3d 1102. In addition

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to affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the WUTC acted within the discretion granted to it by RCW 80.36.510, .520, and .530
when it exempted LECs from the 1991 regulations
and permitted temporary waivers in the 1999 regulations. Id. at 772-73, 66 P.3d 1102.
We granted Judd's subsequent petition for review. Judd v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 150 Wash.2d
1017, 81 P.3d 120 (2003).
II. ISSUES
A. Does RCW 80.36.510 impose substantive duties
on AOS companies separate from the regulations
promulgated by the WUTC?
B. May petitioners challenge the WUTC's disclosure regulations in a non-APA proceeding?
C. Did the trial court properly find that CenturyTel
did not provide long distance services?
*202 III. ANALYSIS
[1] “Construction of a statute is a question of
law which we review de novo under the error of
law standard.” **341Waste Mgmt. of Seattle, Inc. v.
Utils. & Transp. Comm'n, 123 Wash.2d 621, 627,
869 P.2d 1034 (1994).
A. Does RCW 80.36.510 impose substantive duties
on AOS companies separate from the regulations
promulgated by the WUTC?
There is no dispute that the legislature delegated authority to the WUTC to create disclosure
regulations for AOS companies in RCW 80.36.520.
Similarly, given a plain reading, section .510 appears simply to represent the legislature's findings
regarding the need for such regulations. The source
of contention upon which Judd's lawsuit is based is
found in section .530.
RCW 80.36.530 states that a violation of sections .510, .520, or .524 constitutes a violation of
the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), chapter 19.86
RCW. On its face, however, this mandate seems at
odds with the plain language of sections .510 and
.520. How could section .520 itself, which merely

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directs the WUTC to adopt regulations, form the
basis of a CPA violation? Similarly, what kind of
violation can or should be divined from the
amorphous “legislative finding” language in section
.510? The primary question presented in this case,
therefore, is how to interpret legislative intent in
sections .510 and .520 in light of the mandate
provided in section .530.
[2] Judd argues that RCW 80.36.510 provides a
cause of action for failure to provide disclosure of
rates for certain long distance calls that is independent from violations of WUTC regulations promulgated under RCW 80.36.520. Judd and the
Court of Appeals dissent focus their interpretation
of this statute on the notion that “[s]tatutes must be
interpreted and construed so that all the language
used is given effect, with no portion rendered
meaningless or superfluous.” Whatcom County v.
City of Bellingham, 128 *203 Wash.2d 537, 546,
909 P.2d 1303 (1996) (emphasis added); Judd, 116
Wash.App. at 775, 66 P.3d 1102. In order to find an
independent cause of action in section .510,
however, we would be required to read section .510
“without the words, ‘[t]he legislature finds that.’ ”
FN4
Judd, 116 Wash.App. at 776, 66 P.3d 1102.
Reading words out of section .510 in order to interpret the word “or” in section .530 would not be
consistent with the notion that all words in a statute
should be given effect.
FN4. Judd correctly notes that the heading
“legislative finding,” applied to RCW
80.36.510 by the Code Reviser, has no legal effect.
Instead, proper interpretation of RCW
80.36.510 requires us to read section .510 together
with both sections .520 and .530. See Kilian v.
Atkinson, 147 Wash.2d 16, 21, 50 P.3d 638 (2002)
(“In construing a statute, courts should read it in its
entirety, instead of reading only a single sentence
or a single phrase.” (footnote omitted)); State v.
Thorne, 129 Wash.2d 736, 761, 921 P.2d 514
(1996) (“Each provision must be viewed in relation
to the other provisions and harmonized....”). Only

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when read together do the provisions of sections
.510, .520, and .530 make sense.
[3] When the legislature employs the words
“the legislature finds,” as it did in RCW 80.36.510,
it sets forth policy statements that do not give rise
to enforceable rights and duties. See Aripa v. Dep't
of Soc. & Health Servs., 91 Wash.2d 135, 139, 588
P.2d 185 (1978). When considered without reference to section .510, section .520 merely requires
the WUTC to act by promulgating regulations and
does not impose any positive requirements on telecommunications companies. When read together
with the policy statements in section .510 and the
language of section .530, however, it is reasonable
to conclude, as both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals majority did, that the legislature intended a
violation of the WUTC regulations promulgated
pursuant to section .520 to constitute a violation of
the CPA.
[4] The Court of Appeals dissent argues that
such an interpretation does not give effect to RCW
80.36.510. To the contrary, however, the legislative
policy statements in section .510 are “to be considered in construing, interpreting, *204 and administering [the statute]. Such declarations and recitals,
while not operative rules of action, may play **342
a very important part in determining what action
shall be taken.” Whatcom County v. Langlie, 40
Wash.2d 855, 863, 246 P.2d 836 (1952) (citations
omitted). No additional meaning or effect must be
read into section .510.
[5] Considering RCW 80.36.510, .520, and
.530 in pari materia, the Court of Appeals majority
properly concluded that “in order for there to be a
failure to disclose that is actionable under the CPA,
the failure must violate the rules adopted by the
WUTC.” Judd, 116 Wash.App. at 770, 66 P.3d
1102. We affirm. Because we affirm the Court of
Appeals decision that section .510 does not create a
separate cause of action, we do not address whether
the telephone companies provided adequate disclosure by filing rates with the WUTC.

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B. May petitioners challenge the WUTC's disclosure regulations in a non-APA proceeding?
The APA “establishes the exclusive means of
judicial review of agency action.” RCW 34.05.510.
“In an action challenging the validity of a rule, the
agency shall be made a party to the proceeding.”
RCW 34.05.570(2)(a). Although Judd challenges
the validity of the LEC exception in the WUTC's
1991 disclosure regulations and the waiver provisions of the 1999 disclosure regulations, Judd has
not brought an APA action and has not made the
WUTC a party to these proceedings.
The APA provides certain limited exceptions to
the general rule that challenges to an agency action
must be brought under the APA. The exception invoked by Judd permits “litigation in which the sole
issue is a claim for money damages or compensation and the agency whose action is at issue does
not have statutory authority to determine the
claim.” RCW 34.05.510(1) (emphasis added). In
her complaint, however, Judd requested an injunction under RCW 19.86.090, and under the common
law, in addition to money damages. Despite acknowledging that the claim for injunctive relief was
never abandoned, Judd *205 argues that the trial
court had a duty to amend the complaint to permit
the case to be heard as a non-APA action.
Judd claims her position is analogous to the
plaintiff in Seattle Professional Photographers
Ass'n v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9 Wash.App. 656,
661, 513 P.2d 840 (1973). In that case, however,
the plaintiff made a specific request to amend its
complaint in a brief to the trial court. The court
held that the request in the brief was sufficient to
amend the complaint without the need for a separate motion to amend. Id. at 661, 513 P.2d 840 (“In
its trial brief the Association requested permission
to amend its complaint.... CR 15 provides that leave
to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires. The request to amend should have been
granted, and we will consider that the complaint alleges only violations of RCW 19.90.040 ”). Although Judd's brief to the trial court noted that “the

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Court can sever the claim for injunctive relief from
this Complaint,” Judd never requested that the complaint be amended and never moved to withdraw its
claim for injunctive relief. Clerk's Papers at 216.
We disagree that Judd's invitation to the trial court
to abandon the claim for injunctive relief constitutes an affirmative request to amend the complaint.
The trial court does not have an obligation to decide whether individual requests for relief should
be abandoned.
[6] The Court of Appeals correctly upheld the
dismissal of Judd's challenge to the WUTC regulations. The suit was not brought pursuant to the
terms of the APA and does not fit the exception for
suits limited to money damages because Judd never
decided to abandon her request for injunctive relief
and never affirmatively asked the trial court to do
so. Because Judd sought injunctive relief, we do not
need to consider whether her challenge to the
WUTC regulations would otherwise satisfy the
APA exception for suits in which the sole issue is a
claim for money damages or compensation. We
also do not need to consider whether the WUTC exceeded its discretion in creating a LEC exception in
the 1991 regulations and in providing temporary
waivers in the 1999 regulations.
*206 C. Did the trial court properly find that CenturyTel did not provide long-distance services?
The trial court's dismissal of CenturyTel was
based in part on its review of the prison **343 service contract entered into between Washington
State and the telephone companies, including CenturyTel, Qwest, and Verizon, that Judd provided in
support of its claims. The contents and validity of
the contract are not disputed by the parties.
[7] Judd claimed the contract, which contained
a preamble noting that the parties to the contract
would provide local and long distance telephone
service, created an issue of fact. CenturyTel argued
that although the contract made one general reference to the types of service to be provided by all
companies, it is abundantly clear from the rest of
the contract that CenturyTel only contracted to

Page 7

provide local service. Relying on its review of the
undisputed terms of the prison contract, the trial
court properly concluded that claims against CenturyTel should be dismissed because CenturyTel
provided only local telephone service to the prisons. See Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706
(9th Cir.1998) (“a district court ruling on a motion
to dismiss may consider a document the authenticity of which is not contested, and upon which the
plaintiff's complaint necessarily relies”). Accordingly, the dismissal of CenturyTel on this additional
ground is affirmed.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the Court of Appeals decision that
RCW 80.36.510., .520, and .530 only provide a
cause of action for violation of WUTC regulations.
We also affirm the Court of Appeals decision that
Judd may not challenge the validity of the WUTC
regulations without complying with the APA because Judd sought both money damages and injunctive relief. We do not decide whether Judd's
claim would qualify as a suit for “money damages
only” and therefore could be brought without joining the WUTC as a party, if the claim for injunctive
relief had been abandoned. Finally, we agree *207
with the Court of Appeals conclusion that the trial
court did not err in dismissing the claims against
CenturyTel because CenturyTel did not provide
long distance operator services.
WE CONCUR: ALEXANDER, C.J., JOHNSON,
MADSEN, IRELAND, BRIDGE, CHAMBERS and
OWENS, JJ.
SANDERS, J. (dissenting).
I disagree with the majority's holding that
RCW 80.36.510 does not create a cause of action
under the Consumer Protection Act (CPA) independent from claims based on violations of disclosure regulations promulgated by the Washington
Utilities and Transportation Commission (WUTC).
FN1
Majority at 339, 342. The plain language of
RCW 80.36.510 and RCW 80.36.530 dictates the
opposite result, namely that section .510 has independent legal force and a violation of that section

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gives rise to a CPA cause of action under section
.530.
FN1. I agree with the majority that petitioners (Judd) may not challenge the
WUTC's disclosure regulations in this nonAdministrative Procedure Act, chapter
34.05 RCW, proceeding. Majority at 342. I
also agree the trial court did not err by dismissing Judd's claims against CenturyTel
Telephone Utilities, Inc. Id. at 343.
“[E]ach provision of a statute should be read
together (in para materia) with other provisions in
order to determine the legislative intent underlying
the entire statutory scheme.” State v. Chapman, 140
Wash.2d 436, 448, 998 P.2d 282 (2000). This is
buttressed here by the fact that RCW 80.36.510,
.520, and .530 were enacted together in 1988.
LAWS OF 1988, ch. 91, §§ 1-3, codified at RCW
80.36.510, .520, and .530.
RCW 80.36.510 provides:
The legislature finds that a growing number of
companies provide, in a nonresidential setting,
telecommunications services necessary to long
distance service without disclosing the services
provided or the rate, charge or fee. The legislature finds that provision of these services
without disclosure to consumers is a deceptive
trade practice.
Consistent with this declaration, RCW
80.36.520 directs the WUTC to promulgate regulations requiring telecommunications*208 companies
to make “appropriate disclosure to consumers of the
provision and the rate, charge or fee of services
provided.” To ensure those companies take seriously their **344 disclosure obligation, RCW
80.36.530 provides:
In addition to the penalties provided in this title,
a violation of RCW 80.36.510, 80.36.520, or
80.36.524 constitutes an unfair or deceptive act in
trade or commerce in violation of chapter 19.86
RCW, the consumer protection act. Acts in viola-

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tion of RCW 80.36.510, 80.36.520, or 80.36.524
are not reasonable in relation to the development
and preservation of business, and constitute matters vitally affecting the public interest for the
purpose of applying the consumer protection act,
chapter 19.86 RCW. It shall be presumed that
damages to the consumer are equal to the cost of
the service provided plus two hundred dollars.
Additional damages must be proved.
This court has declared that “[w]here the Legislature specifically defines the exact relationship
between a statute and the CPA, this court will acknowledge that relationship.” Hangman Ridge
Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105
Wash.2d 778, 787, 719 P.2d 531 (1986). That is
precisely what the legislature has done here. RCW
80.36.530 plainly declares “a violation” of RCW
80.36.510 or RCW 80.36.520 “constitutes an unfair
or deceptive act in trade or commerce in violation
of chapter 19.86 RCW, the consumer protection
act.” Thus, RCW 80.36.510 has legal effect independent of RCW 80.36.520.
Looking then to RCW 80.36.510, common
sense dictates the substantive provision of that section that may form the basis for “a violation” is the
statement that providing long distance service in a
nonresidential setting without disclosing to consumers service and rate information “is a deceptive
trade practice.” RCW 80.36.510. To that extent,
reading RCW 80.36.510 together with RCW
80.36.530, it is clear that providing such services
without
disclosure,
see
RCW
80.36.510,
“constitutes an unfair or deceptive act in trade or
commerce in violation of ... the consumer protection act,” RCW 80.36.530. Thus, a total failure to
disclose service and rate information to consumers,
as alleged in Judd's complaint,*209 constitutes a violation of RCW 80.36.510, actionable under the
CPA. See RCW 80.36.530. Such an interpretation is
not only based on a plain reading of the statute but
is also necessary to give meaning to the crossreference in RCW 80.36.530 to RCW 80.36.510.
See City of Seattle v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 136

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Wash.2d 693, 698, 965 P.2d 619 (1998)
(recognizing courts must interpret statutes to give
effect to all language used, rendering no portion
meaningless or superfluous).
Nonetheless the majority characterizes RCW
80.36.510 as a mere indication of the legislature's
findings. See majority at 6. Certainly the first statement in that section-“[t]he legislature finds that a
growing number of companies provide, in a nonresidential setting, telecommunications services necessary to long distance service without disclosing the
services provided or the rate, charge or
fee”-appears to be a factual determination. But the
second statement-“[t]he legislature finds that provision of these services without disclosure to consumers is a deceptive trade practice”-is a legal conclusion and not a factual finding. And because
RCW 80.36.530 states a violation of RCW
80.36.510 constitutes a violation of the CPA, this
court must give effect to the second statement.

Page 9

I dissent.
Wash.,2004.
Judd v. American Tel. and Tel. Co.
152 Wash.2d 195, 95 P.3d 337
END OF DOCUMENT

In addition, the majority's interpretation
renders meaningless RCW 80.36.530's declaration
that “a violation of RCW 80.36.510 ... constitutes
an unfair or deceptive act in trade or commerce in
violation of chapter 19.86 RCW, the consumer protection act.” By extension it also fails to give effect
to RCW 80.36.510's statement that “provision of
these services without disclosure to consumers is a
deceptive trade practice.” RCW 80.36.510. Under
the majority's interpretation, the legislature was apparently mistaken when it stated that a violation of
RCW 80.36.510 is actionable under the CPA. Unlike the majority, I am unwilling to engage in such
judicial second-guessing.
In sum, providing long distance telephone service in a nonresidential setting without disclosing
to consumers service and rate information violates
RCW 80.36.510, which in *210 turn gives rise to a
cause of action under the CPA. See RCW 80.36.530
. I would reverse the trial court's grant of summary
judgment on this issue and remand to the **345 trial court to permit Judd to try to establish a violation
of RCW 80.36.510.

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